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This paper presents a case study of the development
of United States policies for Southeast Asia, particularly
as these policies were developed with respect to Burma,
Thailand, and Indochina. There are brief discussions of the
history and background of each of these areas, emphasizing
their relationships with the United States, for the pre-1945
period and the post-War period to 1950. The major portion
of the paper, however, is addressed to the four-year span
1950-1954 when United States interest in Southeast Asia
resulted in a greatly-accelerated level of participation in
the affairs of the area.
In addition to pointing out the evolution of policies
which are still current, there are included discussions of
events which brought the United States to the brink of armed
intervention in Indochina in 1954 and the role of the United
States in the Geneva Conference of that year.
Finally, the background and development of collective
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PREFACE
Nowhere in the world is the United States commitment
to combat communism more active or more demanding than in
Southeast Asia. The problems being faced today in the area
have their genesis in the period immediately following World
War II; the solutions now being sought were begun in 1950
and became institutionalized in the succeeding four years.
The development of United States policies and the
actions which resulted from these policies during the period
1950-1954 represented, first, a marked break with previous
attitude toward the area and, second, a gradual increase in
involvement which reached its apex in 1954. From that time
on, the commitment was firm.
The conditions, both foreign and domestic, which
brought about this significant change in policy have not yet
been subjected to historical analysis. They have, however,
been set forth in public documents in sufficient detail to
permit chronological description and, in some instances,
identification as to relative importance and effect. It is
the purpose of this paper to relate those events and circum-
stances from which United States policies, still in evidence





The area stretching roughly four thousand miles from
the western border of the Union of Burma through West New
Guinea is today known as Southeast Asia—a term which came
into general usage only recently. The region is neither a
cultural nor a political entity, and there is a marked lack
of commonalty among the peoples. In short , it is balkanized
demographically, politically, and geographically.
Before World War II, Southeast Asia as a region was
little known in the West. Referred to as Further India and
Indo-China, the region seemed to be a space between, or
buffer. Even nations with important interests in the area
—
such as, the French, Dutch, and British—disregarded what was
not theirs and concentrated only on their own possessions.
Other nations, notably the United States, demonstrated inter-
est only in economic matters and, where possible, these were
conducted through the European colonial power.
World War II brought with it an awareness of South-
east Asia and a realization of its political and military
importance. Not only were the strategic supplies of rubber,
tin, and petroleum cut off, and maritime traffic from the
Indian Ocean to the Pacific endangered, but, as occupied
-
2territories, the countries of Southeast Asia were potential
battlegrounds. In such circumstances, there was a resur-
gence of interest in the area, particularly by the United
States. In no instance, however, did a Western nation,
regardless of the degree of its interest in the area, appre-
ciate or understand the extent or import of what was happen-
ing there.
Under Japanese occupation, the peoples of Southeast
Asia found a suitable climate in which to pursue national-
istic goals. The "Asia For The Asians" program of the
Japanese held understandable appeal for the people, particu-
larly those who were colonials. By the time that disen-
chantment had set in and it was recognized that "Asia For
The Asians" really meant "Asia For The Japanese," the people
had had a chance to appreciate life free from Western
domination.
For the first time in history, the entire area was
under a single authority. All governments, regardless of
the degree of freedom they seemed to have, were under common
direction and control by Japan. This version of unification
did not last long enough to have implanted a lasting seed of
regional affinity, but it did serve to emphasize the impor-
tance of looking closely at one's neighbors.
The stimulus given to nationalism by World War II set






3denied. During the Japanese occupation, the people experi-
enced a change—a different manner of living—from life as
colonials. Even when the majority of Japanese actions were
disliked, some, such as encouraging the use of the native
language, were welcome changes. It was pleasant to look
upon one's own people as the equals of any. It was habit
forming, tool
In Southeast Asia, nationalism emerged from the war
firmly in control of the hearts and minds of the people.
Colonialism in the area was doomed and European authority
was more fiction than fact. In place of Western domination,
self-determination became the way of life.
In the remainder of this paper, discussion will be
confined to those countries which comprise the northern tier
of Southeast Asia—Burma, Indochina, and Thailand. Fre-
quently referred to as the "rice bowl," these three are the
major source of foods in Southeast Asia. As such, they hold
an interest for their neighbor to the north that is not
duplicated by any other part of Southeast Asia.
Historically, the backgrounds of the three are di-
verse: one has been free; one gained independence peaceably;
and one turned to open rebellion to become free. Politically,
Throughout this paper, the name Thailand is used
even for discussions covering those periods of pre-1939 and







4they encompass the extremes of the East-West spectrum, rang-
ing from alliance with the West through neutralism to
communist-supported revolt. Geographically, they represent
what President Eisenhower referred to as the "cork in the
bottle" as preventing the southward expansion of communism
from China. In effect, all the major problems which beset
Southeast Asia are to be found in large measure in one or
more of these three countries. And because of their prox-
imity to China and their obvious assets, their strategic
importance to the West is as great as that of any of the
countries in the area.
Thailand
The first treaty between the United States and any
Southeast Asian country was one of amity and commerce with
Thailand in 1833. Historically non-colonial throughout the
nineteenth century, Thailand was an island of independence
surrounded by areas under the control of European powers.
That it was able to maintain its independence in the face of
concerted efforts by European countries to expand the areas
under their control is a tribute to its diplomacy and to its
ability to bend with the pressure without breaking. This
talent—or capability, at least—was clearly demonstrated by
Thailand's role in World War II.
In the late 1930' s, Thailand pursued a policy of not




5power in the area, while at the same time cultivating the
rising Japan. In 1939 and 1940, developments in Europe
—
particularly, the success of Germany and the alliance
between Japan and Germany--moved Thailand to a more openly
pro-Japanese position. Coincident with Japan's move into
Indochina, Thailand signed a new treaty of friendship with
Tokyo. Premier Pibul Songgram seemed convinced that war was
coming and that Japan would be on the winning side. Accord-
ingly, a policy of assisting and emulating the Japanese
appeared to be prudent.
With the coming of World War II in the Pacific,
Japan* s hegemony over Thailand was firmly established. On
December 8, 1941, Japanese troops landed on the southern
coast of Thailand and "requested" permission to cross toward
Burma; permission was readily granted. Less than two weeks
later, Japan and Thailand signed a formal alliance; and on
January 25, 1942, Thailand formally declared war upon the
United States and Great Britain—a condition which was duly
recognized and accepted by the United Kingdom but not by the
2United States.
Having aligned herself with Japan, with Japanese en-
couragement Thailand proceeded to acquire territory at the
2A. Vandenbusch and R. Butwell, Southeast Asia Among
the World Powers (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Ken-
tucky Press, 1957), p. 160.

6expense of her neighbors. Thailand seized the four northern
states of Malaya and two Shan states of Burma from the
United Kingdom plus some territory from the French in Indo-
china. This territorial expansion was, however, to prove to
be far more troublesome than beneficial.
In 1944, either through good fortune or commendable
foresight, the pro-Japanese government of Pibul Songgram was
replaced by the more conservative and pro-Allied government
of Pridi Panomyong. From that time until the surrender of
the Japanese, Thailand's efforts were directed at lessening
the degree of collaboration with Japan.
Of the countries of Southeast Asia, Thailand 1 s experi-
ences during World War II had the least subsequent effect
upon her post-war role and development. The flexibility of
her foreign policy, together with an opportunism of consid-
erable magnitude, permitted her to change political direction
as the situation seemed to demand. The end of the war found
her in a position analogous to that of Italy in Europe; her
reputation was a little tarnished but the ill effects were
to be short lived. Insofar as the United States was con-
cerned, Thailand remained an old and valued friend whose
recent activities were not really indicative of her true
self.
Burma
A British colony since 188G , Burma had achieved some
a«w e
sine
7measure of self-government in the years between World Wars I
and II, but realization of independence first came with
Japanese occupation in World War II.
British concessions to Burmese desires for self-
government had been gradual but nevertheless positive. By
1939, Burmese controlled the cultural functions of their
government as well as the economically important forestry
department. Britain retained control of the police and of
financial matters. What the Burmese hoped to attain at that
time was full dominion status within the Commonwealth once
the war in Europe was over; and with that in mind, Premier U
Saw visited the United Kingdom in October and November, 1941,
He was not successful in his quest, however, and en route
home he contacted Japanese officials concerning their plans
for Burma in the event of war in the Far East. The British
discovered this activity while U Saw was still en route and,
as a safety measure, interned him in Uganda for the duration
3
of the war.
Japanese intentions for Burma were soon made known.
In early December, 1941, Japanese forces invaded Burma from
the north and, by the time the rainy season began in May,
1942, victory was complete. A nucleus Burma Independent
Army (BIA) had accompanied the invasion forces, and the
3
J. F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press , 1958), p. 432.
,
8Japanese expanded this nucleus once victory was gained in
the hopes of using the BIA to maintain internal order.
Cruelty and inhuman treatment, however, caused the Burmese
people to cool rapidly in their liking for the Japanese and,
by 1943, organized resistance had begun. Resistance efforts,
largely centered in the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League
4(AFPFL) , reached a peak in March, 1945, when open military
rebellion broke out. The Japanese-trained BIA became the
fighting force for the AFPFL and cooperated closely with
British forces in the final defeat of the Japanese in Burma,
Independence, at least in name, came to Burma in
August, 1943, when a puppet government under Ba Maw was
established and Japan declared Burma to be an independent
state. This "independence," however, did not mean a lessen-
ing of Japanese domination for their army continued to
exercise practical control over the country.
Yet, despite the shortcomings of independence under
Japanese supervision, Burma had, by the end of the war,
experienced enough of the problems and responsibilities of
self-government to be firmly convinced of her ability
The AFPFL was formed by the grouping of dissident
elements; such as, the People's Revolutionary Front, the
Communists, and the Burma Defense Array. That such diverse
organizations could be united was due mainly to the leader-
ship of Aung San, an ardent nationalist who became the




9effectively to cope with them unaided. Her previous desires
for independence were strengthened,
IiiGocnina
French colonialism in Indochina began in the seven-
teenth century and, by the end of the nineteenth, the French
Union of Indochina had been assembled. It comprised the
colony of Cochin China and the protectorates of Annam, Tong-
king, Laos, and Cambodia; all five territories were ruled by
one administration under a governor general.
The beginning of World War II marked the beginning of
the demise of French control of Indochina, With France pre-
occupied with affairs at home, Japan took advantage of the
opportunity, first, to extend its blockade of China to the
Indochinese border and, after the fall of France, to begin
actual occupation of Vietnam. By 1941, the whole of Indo-
china was occupied.
Until March, 1945, the Japanese left the administra-
tion of Indochina in the hands of the local French officials
and, thus, tended to preserve the fiction of French rule.
In actuality, French control and prestige were myths from
the time the Japanese occupied Indochina, The fact that the
regime was directed from Tokyo and that a European would
acquiesce so readily to Oriental control was not lost on the
Indochinese,













World War I when France brought one hundred thousand Indo-
5Chinese troops to Europe. These troops, exposed to Western
democratic concepts , returned to Indochina to become active
supporters of the nationalistic movement. Although nation-
alism continued to flourish in the years between the wars,
World War II provided conditions to insure its success.
The underground resistance in Indochina was centered
in the nationalist movement of Vietnam. French cooperation
with the Japanese in suppressing the resistance strengthened
the anti-French as well as anti-Japanese purpose of these
forces. In May, 1941, the Vietnamese communist party, under
Ho Chi Minn, formed the Vietminh or Vietnam Independence
League. This organization, under the banner of anti-
imperialism, French or Japanese, was able to present a
national united front composed of all classes and factions.
Guerrilla forces were organized and succeeded in gaining
control of some rural areas in the north. By 1944, a lib-
eration army had been formed and resistance activities were
expanded into south Vietnam.
The communist political domination of the Vietminh
was apparent from the first; and, as its area of activity
was expanded, so was communist doctrine spread.
In March, 1945, the Japanese became increasingly
5Vandenbusch and Butwell, o£. cit
. , p. 112.
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concerned over the possibility of Allied landings in Indo-
china and the accompanying possibility that the French ni -'ht
then join the Allied side. In order to forestall any early
defection by the French, Japan sought even closer coopera-
tion with them in the defense of the colony. When the
French refused this, Japanese troops disarmed them and ar-
rested the French officials. Puppet governments were estab-
lished in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; and the end of
colonial status for each was declared. The Vietminh, how-
ever, refused to recognize the authority of these dependent
governments and continued its fight against the Japanese,
The overthrow of the French on March 9 was the actual
end of French rule in Indochina, Before then, despite
Japanese supervision, the French had continued to govern, at
least in name. To many in the rural areas where the
oanese were few, French control was apparently little
changed. Now when the officials were interned and impris-
oned, even this last vestige faded. Thus, as the Japanese
were defeated, the only accepted unifying influence left in
Indochina was the Vietminh. The government of the pro-
French Bao Dai did not long survive the end of the war in
Vietnam for a Vietminh government was formally proclaimed on
September 2.
g
This period is covered in interesting detail by E. J.







There was one final incident which, in the circum-
stances, further strengthened the Vietrainh and widened the
gap between French colonialism and Indochinese nationalism.
The Japanese surrendered to the Chinese in Tongking and the
letminh were permitted by the Chinese to gain a much firmer
foothold than would have been possible had the French them-
selves taken the surrender.
The attitude of the United States was one of interest
in the Indochinese people but, in the final analysis, the
United States remained aloof from developments in Indochina
in 1945* President Roosevelt, according to his Secretary of
State, was an advocate of a plan to put Indochina under a
7trusteeship once the war was endea. Once this plan no
longer had his active support, however, it floundered and
the return of the French to Indochina was not opposed by the
United States.
7
C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York:





At the end of World War II, the United States emerged
as a symbol of hope to much of Southeast Asia, not only
because of a history of anti-colonialism but also because of
the position of power held. For the United States, however,
there were other areas in the world which rated a higher
priority consideration. The result was that, with minor
exceptions, interest in Southeast Asia was limited and
involvement minimal.
In retrospect, there is much to support the allega-
tion that the United States misread the depth and strength
of colonial Asian independence movements. Where these move-
ments looked to the United States , as a strong advocate of
self-determination, for assistance in ridding themselves of
colonialism, they were greeted by bewildering neutrality.
With the exception of the Philippines, the United States
considered independence problems in Southeast Asia as not of
immediate interest. In general, the most forthright demon-
stration of anti-colonialism by the United States was the




had secured their freedom. The reaction of the United
States to problems in Southeast Asia was largely conditioned
by events in other parts of the world. In particular, the
situation in Europe played a determining role in United
States policy and actions. There were, however, exponents
of a more pro-Asian policy within the government and their
2
success in some instances was significant.
In an attempt to be the friend of all and enemy of
none, the United States sought to avoid any position which
might given offense to either nationalist or colonial ele-
ments. Generally, the result was that both were offended.
Involvement in the Philippines and in Indonesia were
isolated examples of affirmative action on the part of the
United States. In the case of the Philippines, granting the
Islands independence in 1946 was a widely-applauded action
which was not made less creditable by the fact that it was
pursuant to a promise of long standing, For the colonies of
Southeast Asia, it was an example which they hoped other
Western nations would follow.
F, Low, Struggle for Asia (New York: F, A. Praeger,
1955), p. 109.
2
G. M. Kahan, in a paper prepared for a conference on
"Southeast Asia in the Coming World" in August, 1952, cited
the Southeast Asia division of the Department of State as
the focus of this pro-Asian group. Their success, according




The United States entered the Dutch-Indonesian dis-
pute only after the affair had reached the U.N. Security
Council and could no longer be overlooked. Nevertheless,
the role of the United States in assisting the transition
from colony to free state was recognized and appreciated.
These two instances were, however, glaring exceptions to the
normal policy of aloofness.
The loss of China to communism brought with it a host
of new problems. Not only was China, on whom the United
States depended for stability in the Far East, now openly
antagonistic but communism was now on the threshold of
Southeast Asia. The time was more than ripe for a reap-
praisal of United States policies and programs for the area.
But even in these circumstances, the situation in Europe
played a disproportionate role in determining United States
policy in Asia.
The late forties saw the rise of NATO, with its need
for European armies, as well as the adoption by the United
States of a policy of containment of communism. The latter
now became particuarly applicable to Southeast Asia; and
since stability in the area is a prerequisite for the suc-
cess of containment, stability in Southeast Asia became
vital. Moreover, stability in Indochina and Indonesia would





In the Congress, increasing amounts of rhetoric were
addressed to the question of United States policies and
actions in the Far East* Comments by Senators Bridges,
Taft, Brewster, and Vandenberg expressed concern for the
3inadequacies of United States planning with regard to China.
In the House, Mr. Judd was outspoken in his criticism of our
4Asian policies. Bipartisan foreign policy was sorely
tested by Senator Knowland's "Concurrent Resolution to
Investigate Foreign Policy in the Far East," which he sub-
mitted on April 21, 1949. It was a broad proposal to
ascertain our present policy in the Far East and what
policies have heretofore been followed by the U.S. in
regard to Far Eastern affairs and to evaluate and
determine the effect of such policies .5
While the remarks mainly concerned China, they were also
applicable to Southeast Asia.
American policy adjustments were obviously necessary,
and the latter part of 1949 saw considerable activity in
this regard. A searching review and evaluation of United
States policy in the Far East was begun by Mr. Raymond B.
Fosdick and Dr. Everett Case, working with Ambassador-at-
Large Jessup. Other personnel within the Department of
3United States Congress, Congressional Record , 81st
Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing
Office), p. 8293.
4Ibid., p. A2725. 5Ibld., p. 4862.
-tt-
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State were similarly occupied* A new set of guide lines
was being prepared, guide lines which, for the first time,
would consider the area as a whole.
Thailand
The end of the war in the Pacific brought British
troops to Thailand to receive the surrender of the Japanese
forces stationed there. The Allies had no detailed, spe-
cific policy concerning the liberation of Southeast Asia}
and since the British controlled the Southeast Asian Command,
it fell to them to supervise the Japanese surrender in all
of that area except northern Indochina.
Concurrent with receiving the surrender of the Japa-
nese troops in Thailand, the United Kingdom took the oppor-
tunity to present the Thais with the terras under which the
state of war between the two countries could be ended.
Contrary to the position taken by the United States, Britain
considered Thailand to be a defeated enemy and not a liber-
ated country. Thailand had committed hostile acts against
British territory in Malaya and Burma, and these acts were
not to be easily overlooked by London. Accordingly, Anglo-
Thai relationships were of the victor-vanquished category,
and the demands made by Britain were for full retribution
for losses suffered. Included in these original demands
Department of State Bulletin , 15 August 1949, p. 236.
'
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were British control of Thailand* s civil service, British
regulation of exports, and establishment of a British pro*
tectorate over Thailand until such a time as Thailand would
7be admitted to the United Nations*
These demands were regarded as excessive by both the
United States and China* At American instigation, the
question of Thailand's Indemnity to the United Kingdom was
the subject of U*S*-U.K* discussions, and more moderate
demands were agreed upon* On January 1, 1946, Britain and
Thailand concluded a treaty of peace which provided for the
return to Britain of the four Malayan and two Burman prov-
inces plus payment of damages by the delivery of 1*5
9
million tons of rice to British-controlled territories*
Thailand was, at last, officially at peace*
Because of the refusal of the United States to recog-
nize the existence of a state of war between them, U. 5*-Thai
7
F* H* Michael and G. E. Taylor, The Far Seat in t.^e
Modern World (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1956), p. "5$7*
H. K* Vinacke, A History of The Far East in Modern
Times (New York: AppleTon-Century-Crofts , Inc., T3F59),
p. 776*
L. S* Finkelstein, American Policy in Southeast Asia
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc*, 195i),~"
p. 9.
Either at British request or as a gesture of good
will, Thailand resumed the name Slam in an effort to play
down the irredentlsm which had led to the wartime seizure








relations were resumed as though little had happened. The
insistence of the United States that the wartime government
of Thailand had not represented the true feelings of the
people, plus the "Free Thai" movement which had aided the
Allies throughout the war, did much to ease the path of
Thailand in regaining a position of respectability in the
world. In late 1946, Thailand applied for admission to the
UN and, in 1947, became the fifty-fifth member of the organi-
zation.
In November, 1947, the collaborationist wartime Pre-
mier, Songgram, overthrew the government which had replaced
him in 1944 and, with elections, regained the premiership.
The two years since the end of the war had all but erased
the Western powers* dislike of Songgram, and no opposition
was offered to his return. The deposed Premier, Pridi
Panomyong fled the country and remained quiescent until 1954
*
The Songgram government proved itself to be unfet-
tered by its wartime anti-Western alignment. In a demon-
stration of flexibility In foreign policy, Songgram aligned
his nation firmly on the side of the West.
Several factors contributed to this decision. First
was the non-colonial history of Thailand. There was no
intense anti-Western feeling and no emotional deterrent to
cooperating with the Wes . Second was the good will built
up by the United States in the first post-war years. It was
.:.
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appreciated by the Thais that a large measure of credit was
due the United States for its part in mitigating the terms
of the Anglo-Thai peace treaty.
Thailand was a unique example of success for the
United States in Southeast Asia, Since Thailand had no
direct European ties, U.S. policies toward her were not
viewed in the same light as were policies toward the colo-
nial areas. Moreover, the absence of conflict for self-
determination permitted the United States to act affirma-
tively rather than attempt to remain friends with both sides
of the dispute. The result was that, with the possible ex-
ception of the Philippines, no other country in Southeast
Asia was a comparable reservoir of pro-U.S. sentiment.
Burma
Post-war Burma represented the nadir of activity on
the part of the United States in support of the principle of
self-determination. Whether this inactivity resulted from a
lack of knowledge of what was going on there, from apathy,
or from an overriding desire to avoid interfering in British
affairs, two years had elapsed before the United States even
voiced approval of the negotiations which led to Burmese
independence
•





With the defeat of the Japanese in Burma by British
forces supported by the Burma Independence Army (BIA), the
British sought to establish the pre-war form of government*
The Burmese, however, were determined not to accept this and,
led by the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL) under
Aung San, resistance grew rapidly. What Burma wanted—and
considered itself qualified for—was the right to determine
its own future without British intervention.
The impasse between Britain and Burma was resolved
mainly because of the belated recognition by the British
Labour government that accommodation to Burmese demands was
the lesser of two evils. Accordingly, negotiations leading
toward independence were begun in London in January, 194 7,
Independence was proclaimed in January, 1948, and, in April,
1948, the Union of Burma was admitted to the UN as its fifty-
eighth member.
Internal stability became the major problem confront-
ing the new nation and it was to this that the majority of
12governmental effort was directed. The communists, in
1947, had renounced the AFPFL for the alleged pro-British
attitude of the League; and, when independence was pro-
claimed, civil war erupted. For a decade the government
would be faced with internal conflict from both the Red
12
T. Kalijarvi and Associates, Modern World Politics








(Trotsky) and White (Stalin) Communists and from the Karen
tribes in the lower part of Burma. In 1948 and 1949, there
were times when the rebels held more of Burma than did the
government. 13
From the beginning, Burma's foreign policy was formu-
lated in the light of two conditions : the first was the
proximity of China and the second was the depth of anti-
colonial feeling. An appreciation of the need to avoid
antagonizing the giant to the north, particularly after the
defeat of the Nationalist Chinese, dictated a neutralist
behavior with slight anti-West overtones. Burma was the
14first non-communist nation to recognize Communist China.
Indochina
Throughout the war, while governing under Japanese
supervision and especially when replaced by a puppet govern-
ment, the French believed that all that was necessary to
regain complete control of Indochina was to have the war
end. From the beginning of the post-war period, however,
this proved to be a misconception of the first order.
The liberation of Indochina was accomplished by
13A. Vandenbusch & R. Butwell, Southeast Asia .. iong
the World Powers (Lexington, Kentucky: University of
Kentucky Press, 1957), p. 231.
14A. D. Barnett, -ommunlst China and Asia (New York:








British forces in the south and Chinese troops in the north;
and, from the beginning, the liberating armies differed in
their treatment of the returning French* In the south, the
British supported the restoration of the pre-war government
and expedited as much as possible the actual turnover of
administration to the French, In the north, the Chinese
pursued a policy of neutralism between the Vietminh and the
French and delayed in withdrawing their forces for a full
year.
In both north and south, the French found an operating
government under Ho Chi Minn which had wide acceptance by
the Vietnamese people. The Vietminh, which had been the
principal anti-imperialist force, active against both the
French and the Japanese, declared its independence from
France on September 2, 1945, and set about to establish the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, By virtue of his wartime
activities against the Japanese, Ho Chi Minh enjoyed a cer-
tain measure of popularity among the Allies; and, in the
initial stages of his fight for independence, he had sym-
pathy, if not active support, from the United States and
China,
The official position of the United States vis-a*-vis
the struggle in Indochina came in a speech by the Director
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of
State in October, 1945, in which he stated that the United
.
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States would not intervene but would assist, if requested,
15in the peaceful settlement of the dispute. Having made
this slight excursion into the arena, official Washington
then lapsed into silence and total non-involvement for
nearly two years*
The French had not experienced much difficulty in re-
establishing hegemony, if not outright control, over
Laos and Cambodia, In January, 1946, an agreement providing
some autonomy to Cambodia was signed and a similar agreement
for Laos was signed in August. In Vietnam, however, the
line of separation was being clearly drawn. Bao Oai, having
abandoned his own government in favor of the Vietminh, be-
came the "supreme councilor" to Ho Chi Minh in September,
1945. In late 1945, the French position was, throughout
Vietnam, one of weakness. Some success in driving the Viet-
minh from the cities in the south had been achieved, but
there was no progress made in gaining popular support for a
government which was based on pre-war colonialism.
In early 1946, France realized that, in the existing
circumstances, a peaceful solution to the problem was impor-
tant. To this end, negotiations between Ho and General
Leclerc were begun in Saigon and agreement was reached on
Address by J. C. Vincent before the Foreign Policy
Association, New York, October 20, 1945, as reported in The
New York Times, October 21. 1945.
•Ofljft c
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16March 6 t 1946, Provided for was French recognition of the
Republic of Vietnam as a free state within the French Union.
The Republic was to consist of the protectorates of Annam
and Tongking with the accession of Cochin China to be
decided by a later plebescite. For his part, he agreed not
to oppose the return of French troops to all of Vietnam for
a period not to exceed five years.
The terras of the agreement were, however, subject to
different interpretation by the two sides. The principal
difference lay in the opposing concepts of the nature of the
French Union. The French wanted a tightly-knit League, com-
posed of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, presided over by a
French High Commissioner with broad powers. The Vietminh
idea was a loose federation of independent states with no
17
supra-national official.
In order to resolve this and other differences, Ho
Chi Minn visited France in September, 1946, and reached a
modus vlvendi with the French in meetings at Fontainebleau.
The truce was short lived, however, for the agreement en-
countered early opposition from the extremists of both sides.
For Ho, the criticism held that the terms were too "soft" and
that the French were exhibiting bad faith, particularly with
Low, o£. cit., p. 147.






regard to the referendum in Cochin China, The result was
that Ho, either convinced by, or yielding to, the criticism,
revolted against the French in December, 1946,
Outwardly, success in the struggle appeared to go to
the French in 1947. The Vietminh were forced to guerrilla
warfare in the countryside while the French consolidated
their hold on the cities and coastal areas. Gradually,
French control was expanded to include inland towns, but the
rural areas remained beyond their grasp.
By mid-1947, the French recognized that no lasting
solution would be possible until some of the nationalistic
aspirations of the Vietnamese were realized. Still deter-
mined to ignore the communist Vietminh as a rightful govern-
ment, the French began to make overtures to Bao Dai in the
hopes of using him as a rallying point for Vietnamese na-
tionalism. Bao Dai, who had wearied of his position in the
Vietminh hierarchy in 1946 and had gone into exile in Hong
Kong, was reluctant at first. Later, however, he gave his
approval of the Provisional Central Government, which the
French had established, but he did not return to Vietnam at
that time. 18
In an attempt to increase the popularity of the Pro-
visional government, the French agreed to the inclusion of







Cochin China in Vietnam, a concession previously denied to
Ho Chi Minn, In spite of this and other concessions, how-
ever, the new government remained weak in public acceptance.
This prompted the French to renew their efforts to get Bao
Dai to return, and in this they had at least the tacit en-
couragement of the United States to whom a solution of the
dispute had become important. The adversities suffered by
the Chinese Nationalists had highlighted the significance of
the communist influence in the Vietroinh and the United States
policy of aloofness toward Indochina began to disappear.
In response to assurances by the French of independ-
ence with autonomy in administrative matters (foreign and
military matters were to remain in the hands of the French),
Bao Dai agreed to return. He landed in Vietnam on April 28,
1949, and was proclaimed Emperor on June 14.
To the French, the return of Bao Dai and the conces-
sions represented a strong Inducement to the Vietnamese to
return to the French Union. It was a characteristic of
French concessions, however, that they were either too
little, too late, or conditional upon some future develop-
19
ment; this example includes some of all three.
For the United States, there was hope, if not convic-
tion, that this new attempt would permit the "realization of
19Low, o£. cit





20the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people." The
extent of the French commitment to the struggle in Vietnam
was a source of concern to the United States , whose European
policy was predicated upon a strong and economically sound
France. Moreover, the success of the Chinese Communists had
given the situation in Indochina a special import to the
United States.
The affair could no longer be ignored. What was
needed was a program which ideally would be at once anti-
communist and anti-colonial. Unfortunately, this seemed to
call for direct intervention by the United States, and this
was politically unacceptable. Material support of the French
or multilateral intervention, such as by the UN, were the
alternates.
Curiously, both East and West seemed to be in agree-
ment to keep the dispute? out of the UN. To the communists,
bringing the problem before the UN would have meant making a
choice between the desires of the French communists and
those of the Vietminh. For the West, it would have meant
either embarrassing France or appearing to support coloni-
alism. In such circumstances, the struggle was best left in
relative seclusion.
20






THE NEW ERA (1950-1954)
General
The results of the reconsideration of United States
Far Eastern policies were first made public in a speech by
Secretary of State Acheson on January 12, 1950. Mr.
Acheson began his address by stating: "I am frequently
asked: Has the State Department got an Asian policy?" and
proceeded to reply to the question. Although the speech was
directed at Asia as a whole, there were points specifically
applicable to Southeast Asia.
First was the revulsion felt by the United States
against two conditions which were widespread in S-E-A—
poverty and foreign domination. Implicit in this was the
desire of the United States to aid the peoples of S-E-A in
raising their levels of human well-being while achieving or
maintaining their freedom. The United States was interested
in the peoples of Asia, not just the governments, but "the
limits of what we can do are to help where we are wanted."
Moreover, United States help could not accomplish the task
at hand without the full and energetic cooperation of the
people themse. ves. American assistance should be regarded





missing component in a situation which might otherwise
be solved. The United States cannot furnish all these
components to solve the question. It cannot furnish
the determination, it cannot furnish the will and it
cannot furnish the loyalty of a people to its govern-
ment.
Second was that United States policy was not moti-
vated solely by anti-communism but rather by the need to
prevent communist imperialism from taking "from these people
what they have won and what we want them to keep and develop,
which is their own national independence, their own develop-
ment of their own resources for their own good • • • •"
Third was the delineation of an American defense
perimeter as running from the Aleutians to Japan, the
Ryukyus and the Philippines. Prophetically, this excluded
Korea as well as S-E-A, but the Secretary did intimate that
hostile acts outside this perimeter might provoke responsive
action by the United States.
Last, it was the announced policy of the United
States to seek solutions of the problems of "subversion and
penetration" by other than military means.
Mr. Acheson discussed the complexities which con-
fronted the United States in S-E-A, mentioning the difficult
situation which existed in Burma and the progress which was
being made in Indochina. The general conclusion to be drawn
from his address was that a new day had dawned in Asia and
this was recognized by the United States.
• • .
31
As a policy statement, the address was a welcome
indication that the United States had abandoned its policy
of disinterest in Southeast Asia, In its humanistic ap-
proach, it offered to the people of Asia evidence of an
understanding of their problems which had not been apparent
before.
This "new look" at Asia was in consonance with an
article written by Mr, Fosdick upon his return from his
2joint mission with Dr, Case, noted earlier. In his article,
Mr. Fosdick pointed to the need for the United States to
identify itself with the "just and humane" purposes of the
nationalistic movements in Asia, He envisaged the task
before the United States to be "• • , to make sure, as far
as we can, that the aspirations of the people of Asia for
freedom and justice and more abundant living have a fair
chance," In reply to those who championed military measures
as the primary means of solving the problem, Mr, Fosdick
said: "Arms undoubtedly have their place, but we are up
against a set of ideas and ideas cannot be stopped with
bombs or battleships. The only way to beat an idea is with
a better idea . . , ." From the similarity of tone between
the Fosdick-Case findings and Mr. Acheson's January speech,
2






it is probable that the latter was based, in large measure,
upon the former.
The remainder of the first half of 1950 was replete
with evidence that, having gotten underway at last, United
States policy for Southeast Asia was proceeding apace. At
least, public pronouncements so indicated. Secretary
Acheson announced that the United States had extended to
Emperor Bao Dai "the hope that closer relationship will be
3
established between Vietnam and the United States." Ambas-
sador Jessup*s Bangkok conference of ambassadors ended
February 15 , reporting that it had discussed the assistance
which could support the national aspirations of the peoples
4
of Southeast Asia. On February 23, announcement was made
of a mission to Southeast Asia, headed by R. Allan Griffin,
which would survey the situation in terms of what aid could
be given. There was obvious interest in the area and on a
scale difficult to imagine a year previous.
On March 15 , Secretary Acheson iterated the broad
concepts of his January I2tb speech but expanded them to
include the extension of the Truman Doctrine to Southeast
3Department of State Bulletin , February 13, 1950,
p. 244.
4Ibid., March 27, 1950, p. 502.
..
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5Asia. It was an important addition to United States
policy.
In April, John Foster Dulles was appointed as Special
Consultant to Secretary Acheson with the primary assignment
of negotiating a peace treaty with Japan and returning her
to a position of respectability in the family of nations.
The appointment was significant in that it presaged the
beginning of the reconstruction of Japan and a continuing
association of Mr. Dulles with Southeast Asia.
There was growing concern over the possibility that
Southeast Asia would be further attracted toward communism
in view of developments in China. An an example of success-
ful "nationalism" there was much in China to influence the
nationalist movements in Southeast Asia. The extent of this
concern was apparent when Asian problems were the first
order of business at the Foreign Ministers Meeting in London
6 7
on May 16 and at conferences in Paris before the meeting.
The Griffin Mission completed its survey in May and
recommended that $60,000,000 in economic aid be made
5Speech before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco,
March 15, 1950, as reported in Department of State Bulletin ,
March 27, 1950, p. 500.
Department of State Bulletin , May 29, 1950, p. 828.
7




available to Southeast Asia. The proposed distribution of
this amount was announced promptly by Acting Secretary of
State Webb, together with plans for an additional $75,000,000
gin military aid for the areas.
This long-over-due involvement in the problems of
Southeast Asia was to be brought into sharp focus shortly.
In June, 1950, the Korean War gave priority in United States
policies to Asian affairs in general, but nearly all were
viewed in the context of their effect upon the war. The aid
programs, begun only months before, were continued for they
were in direct support of anti-communism. The contributions
of Southeast Asian nations to the United Nations force in
Korea were welcomed albeit much more for their symbolism
than for their military value. A new mission to survey the
Southeast Asia in terms of military aid requirements com-
menced its tour on July 5 and visited all countries in the
area except Burma. Headed by John Melby, the Mission was to
make recommendations concerning arms shipments and the compo-
9
sition of United States Advisory Groups. In essence, Korea
did not invalidate the new policies announced at the begin-
ning of the year, but it did add a sense of realism to them.
Within the Congress, 1950 had been a year of partisan
8Ibid. , May 12, 1950.





criticism—and defense—of Far East policies. Most of the
comments concerned China or, after June, Korea. Southeast
Asia was mentioned principally in terms of the aid being
offered or in support of the thesis that the loss of China
to communism was a criminal blunder. The only bi-partisan
effort of note was a proposal by Senators Morse (R) and
Pepper (D) to place the Indochina dispute before the United
Nations inasmuch as there was danger in continuing to sup-
port France without others Joining in. Aside from this
isolated instance, the Congress was divided along political
lines; it was the time of McCarthy, and it was an election
year.
The Eighty-second Congress convened to pick up dis-
cussion of the United States Far East policy where the
Eighty-first Congress had left it. As might be imagined,
the main concern in Asia was centered about Korea, but South-
east Asia did receive both thought and comment. Fortunately,
it was far more bi-partisan in character than had been the
case in the preceding year.
On January 5, 1951, Senator Taft spoke concerning the
use of United States forces in Southeast Asia and opposed
the use of any ground forces. Ten days later, Senator
Congressional Record , 81st Congress, 2d Session






Douglas said that the United States could protect Southeast
Asia as well as Europe and that ground forces would not be
necessary; the job could be done by our superior sea and air
forces • The sense—and import—of Senator Douglas' speech
was that Southeast Asia, particularly the area of Indochina,
Burma, and Thailand, was strategically important to us and
should not be neglected as we looked so closely at Europe*
s
problems.
There were, however, less constructive or responsible
discussions which kept the United States on the defensive,
domestically, concerning Asian policies. Senator Jenner, on
September 24, 1951, spoke at length in the Senate, reviewing
United States policies in the Far East. He broadened the
McCarthy charges to include the alleged treasonable conduct
of General Marshall, and he stated that the United States
had two policies for Asia: the first that of the President,
the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; t
second that of MacArthur, the fighting men, and the American
13people. Aimed primarily at China and Korea, the speech
contributed to the ill-repute of all United States foreign
affairs, particularly within the country itself. There was







his Far East tour, the United States was taking a "beating"
14in Southeast Asia,
In the matter of aid, the United states made positive
progress in 1951, First was the Mutual Security Act of 1951
which, inter alia , improved the administrative procedures
for distributing funds and established certain criteria which
need be met in order to receive aid. In Southeast Asia, the
United States associated itself with the Colombo Plan in
recognition of the pressing need for economic improvement
throughout the area. Military aid in increasing amounts was
being provided, the largest portion going to Indochina,
During the major part of 1952, foreign affairs were
much discussed. The Presidential and Congressional elections
were fought in large part around questions of foreign rela-
tions with particular attention being given to the problems
of the Far Dast. The Truman Administration's handling of
Asian affairs was the prime target of the Republicans attack.
Republican candidates called loudly for a new "dynamic
policy," promising, if elected, the "roll back" of communist
15power. This new and vigorous policy was, moreover, to be
accompanied by reducing both the budget and the involvement
14Ibid
., p. 3358,
15D. B. Goebel (ed,), American Foreign Policy--
A
cumentary Survey 1776-1960 (New York: Holt, RlnenarF and





of United States military forces in Asia, In essence, "if
there must be war there, let it be 'Asians against
Asians.'" 16
While internal politics dominated the year, United
States policy for Southeast Asia did undergo a slight but
significant change when the United States joined with the
United Kingdom and France in issuing a warning in the United
Nations concerning Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast
Asia, Such aggression would "be a matter of direct and
grave concern which would require the most urgent and ear-
17
nest consideration by the United Nations," This repre-
sented a marked departure from the previous policy of
keeping the Indochina question outside the United Nations.
In the Congress, suggestions of substance were few as
campaign utterances replaced objective discussions of for-
eign policies. Senator Smith did make a tour of the Par
East for the Committee on Foreign Relations, but Southeast
Asia was not included in the itinerary.
The Eisenhower Administration's policy toward South-
east Asia did not differ significantly from that of the
16
Eisenhower speech, as reported in The New York
Times, October 3, 1952.
17As quoted in M. S. Farley, United States delations
with Southeast Asia (New York; American Institute of
Pacific Relations, 1955), p, 5,
.
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Truman Administration insofar as it applied to Southeast
Asia. There was new enthusiasm for foreign affairs, and the
war in Korea was stopped but the broad guide lines remained
unchanged. As the truce negotiations in Korea progressed,
concern over Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia heightened
and, Increasingly, public statements were directed toward
the Southeast Asia situation. When the armistice was signed,
the sixteen members of the United Nations who had fought in
18Korea issued a faint warning to Communist China. Presi-
dent Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles emphasized the impor-
tance the United States attached to Southeast Asia and Mr.
Dulles, in a speech before the American Legion stated that
Chinese aggression "could not occur without grave conse-
19quence which might not be confined to Indochina."
-s doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" was the
implementation of the Republic campaign promises to reduce
expenditures while increasing strength. However, since it
represented a policy of making any local situation one of
global importance, it aroused some apprehension among
friends; apprehension that continued for some years, but it
20
was not all bad.
18
The New York Times , August 8, 1953.
1 Ibid. , September 5, 1953.
20
0. E. Clubb, The U.j>. and the Slno-Soviet Bloc in
!
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The aid programs for the countries of Southeast Asia
were progressing in exemplary fashion. Expenditures for
technical and economic aid were necessarily spread over a
span of years, but the military aid program was concentrated
so that expenditures equaled appropriations in each fiscal
year. Secretary Dulles, in his press conference on May 9,
1953, spoke with enthusiasm concerning United States aid for
the countries of that area and cited two examples of where
requests for emergency aid were met within twenty-four
hours*
Aside from the aid programs, however 9 there was little
from which to gain comfort* The situation throughout South-
east Asia was not reassuring insofar as gaining the offensive
against communism was concerned* This was especially so in
Indochina.
The period 1950-1954 had seen the United Ste
tude change from aloofness to keen interest* We had come to
Southeast Asia (Washington! The Brookings Institution, 1962),
pTTTT" ibh credits the policy with aiding in ending the
war in Indochina* According to his thesis, the Soviets were
wary of letting the war in Indochina go on in view of United
States determination to use massive retaliation and the
Soviet commitment to China.
21
The New York Times t May 10, 1953* The examples





realize that "• • • it is the security, even the survival,
22
of the free world that is threatened in Asia,"
Thailand
In early 1950, Thailand's government abandoned its
policy of pro-Western neutrality and openly aligned itself
with the West in the cold war. It was the final step of a
program begun in 1945 and a welcome climax for United States
efforts throughout the preceding five years. As a reward
for a courtship which had little justification in the begin-
ning, it was appropriate. Insofar as its near-terra benefits
to Thailand were concerned, however, it was disappointing.
As in other Southeast Asia countries, the United
States had two missions in Thailand in 1950: the first, the
Griffin mission, surveying the requirements for economic and
technical aid; the second, the Melby mission, concerned with
military aid. Both missions recommended the allocation
aid in amounts comparable to that programmed for Burma and
Indonesia.
That the United States was partial to Thailand and
prone to accept or overlook a great deal was evident in its
attitude from 1945 on. As the Director of the Office of
United States Congress, House, Report 2025 on
Special Study Mission to Southeast Asia , 83rd Congress, 2d
Session, July 2, 1954.
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Philippines and Southeast Asian Affairs remarked, the United
States blamed the Japanese occupation for the present politi-
23
cal weakness of Thailand.
The agreements to provide economic and military aid
were signed on September 19, 1950, and October 17, 1950,
respectively. Such was the reputation of the Thailand-
United States relationship that United States Ambassador
Stanton felt constrained to point out that the agreement was
neither a defense pact nor a United States request for bases;
it was merely an agreement in response to a Thailand request
24for help in order to strengthen its defenses and economy,
Thailand's response to the United Nations resolution
concerning Korea was to send four thousand troops and a
small naval contingent to join the United Nations forces.
This gesture of support was particularly encouraging and
welcome in view of its propaganda value. Full logistic sup-
25port for the forces was provided by the United States.
23
W. S. B. Lacy, Director of the Office of Philippine
and Southeast Asian Affairs, in an address at Institute of
Public Affairs, University of Virgina, Charlottesville,
Virginia, July 11, 1950, as reported in Vital Speeches ,
September 1, 1950, p. 689.
24
Department of State Bulletin , October 30, 1950,
p. 702.
25In the summer of 1951, a Thailand PC ran aground






Thailand also voted for the February 1, 1951, resolution
which branded Communist China an aggressor in Korea,
In 1950, there were two notable weaknesses in the
Thailand government: internal instability as a result of
economic problems and political dictatorship. Economic aid
assisted in removing the first from the acute category, but
the second continued tc thrive through 1954. The "Free
Thailand Movement," headed by former Premier Pridi and based
in China, was a constant irritant whose allegations were
difficult to deny in their entirety.
As the Vietminh gained in Indochina, the seriousness
of Thailand's position increased. Not only might she be
subject to overt invasion, but the possibility of subversion
was greatly increased. In these circumstances, Thailand
moved even closer to the United States,
In the case of the nationalist Chinese soldiers in
Burma, Thailand supported the United States efforts and pro-
vided the staging area for the evacuation of those who did
return to Taiwan, There was no occasion in 1953 and 1954
when Thailand did not publicly side with the United States
and cooperate to the fullest extent possible. Having
decided that a policy of even quasi-neutrality was no longer
prudent, Thailand turned wholeheartedly to a pro-United
States policy.




activities in Thailand became more and more those which were
in support of the struggle to the north. In a press con-
ference, Secretary Dulles urged United Nations support in
26
case of communist invasion of Thailand, an invasion which
would come from Indochina, By December, 1953, the United
States did not consider the threat of invasion by the Viet-
27
minh to be significant although, within a month, the
availability of United States protection in the event of
28
communist attack was reaffirmed.
As the threat grew, so did United States aid, par-
ticularly military assistance. In fiscal year 1951, expen-
ditures for military aid were $4.5 million; in fiscal year
1962, $12 million; in fiscal year 1953, $55.8 million; and
29in fiscal year 1954, $38.9 million. This build-up of
military strength was supervised by an aid mission which in
1954 numbered about three hundred personnel. In late 1954,
Thailand's commitment to the West was made even more firm by




, December 30, 1953.
28Ambassador Donovan as reported in The -lew York
Times, January 26, 1954.
29Report of United States Foreign Assistance Program,
United States Agency for International Development, Washing-
ton, 1962.






her adherence to SEATO, As one of three Asian members and
as the only one located in continental Southeast Asia, her
importance to the organization was large, both strategically
and psychologically. Her enthusiastic participation in
SEATO has not been exceeded by any other member; first to
ratify the treaty, home of the headquarters, and provider of
the Secretary General.
In Thailand, the United States encountered a unique
attitude of pro-Westernism—one that differed both in scope
and enthusiasm from that of any other Southeast Asia nation
with the possible exception of the Philippines, In return
for a commitment to support and protect Thailand, the United
States has gained a valued ally. Whatever the policies
which produced this result—and they are difficult to cor-
relate with our other Southeast Asian policies—they were
proved to be prudent.
Burma
By mid-1950 the internal unrest that had plagued
Burma since her independence began to ease. The Kasen
tribes had ceased to dominate the lower part of the country
and the communists had contributed to their own weakness by
intra-party conflict. The Burmese government established





The neutralism that Burma had adopted caused an am-
bivalence toward United States aid programs once they began
to reach Southeast Asia, In the spring of 1950, the Griffin
mission recommended that economic and technical assistance
31be given Burma, and on September 13, 1950, an agreement to
this effect was signed by Burma and the United States, As
concerned military aid, however, the attitude of the Burmese
was different*
In the summer, another mission, under John Melby,
with the task of smoothing the way for military aid in
Southeast Asia, met with less success. The Minister of
Defense would not receive the mission, and the visit was,
32therefore, cancelled. Accordingly, no official program of
military assistance between the two nations was established
although it is reported that some such assistance was pro-
vided, 33
The economic and technical aid was directed into pro-
grams concerned with health, transportation, agriculture,
and industry. From 1950-1954, about $20,000,000 was ex-
pended and in roughly equal amounts for each category. Even
when the aid program was terminated in 1953 at the reque t
31The New York Times , April 3, 1950.
32
Ibid ., September 7, 1950.
33Finkelstein, o£. cit




of the Burmese government, some United States technicians
stayed on in the employ of Burma.
If the framework of Burma's foreign policy was neu-
tralism and non-alignment, the chosen instrument for
carrying out the policy was the United Nations* From the
beginning, Burma was an active participant in United Nations
deliberations and affairs. Only in her consideration of
situations involving Communist China did Burma vary from
adherence to neutralist principles. In June, 1950, Burma
supported the United Nations resolution which condemned
North Korea as an aggressor, yet in February 1951, she voted
against an Assembly Resolution which classed China as an
aggressor.
Relationships between Burma and the United States in
the period under discussion were conducted in an atmosphere
relatively free from major discord. One minor incident con-
cerned the arrest and conviction of Dr. Gordon Seagrave for
assisting the Karen tribes in their rebellion against the
government. Dr. Seagrave was well known to, and admired by,
Americans and his trial aroused concern for his well-being.
The problem disappeared, however, with no ill feelings on
either side when his appeal resulted in his release.
A more serious problem, and one demanding more





diplomatic activity, was the incident of the Chinese Nation-
alist soldiers in Burma* With the collapse of the National-
ist army in 1950, a small group (estimated 1-2000) of
Chinese soldiers in Yunnan Province fled before the commu-
nists and crossed the border into Burma, Living freely off
the land and enjoying freedom of movement to raid Communist
China, these soldiers constituted a major source of embar-
rassment to Burma. In the first place, they continued to
grow in number and thus further contravened Burmese sover-
eignty over the area; and in the second place, they presented
a growing provocation to Communist China. In early 1953,
Burma estimated the number of troops had grown to 12,000.
The Chinese communist had charged that these troops
received supplies from the United States and that they con-
stituted an invasion force. The United States denied the
charge of supplying the force and was partly successful in
convincing Burma of the inaccuracy of the Chinese allegation.
The matter had become critical in the eyes of the Burmese,
however; and in March 1953, Burma took the issue to the
United Nations, charging the Nationalist Chinese government
35
with aggression. Coincident with this development, F urma
36terminated the United States aid program.
35
The New York Times , March 27, 1953.
36According to Farley, the termination resulted from
Burmese domestic pressure rather than from anger at the








The discussion before the United Nations was a source
of embarrassment to the United States and, in an attempt to
cut it short, the United States sought to settle the dispute
37between Burma and Nationalist China, The discussion con-
tinued, however, and the United Nations Assembly adopted a
resolution calling upon the soldiers to leave Burma and for
United Nations members to refrain from assisting them.
The dispute was not so easily disposed of in practice
as it was on paper. Many of the Chinese refused repatriation;
and for those who would leave Burma, transportation was a
problem, 6y mid-1954, Burma announced that some four
38thousand troops still remained. By November, 1953, how-
ever, ill feeling toward the United States over this situa-
tion had eased as a result of American efforts to assist in
evacuating the Chinese, and relationships returned to normal.
The attitude the United States had toward neutralists
in the early days of the Eisenhower Administration was one
of trying to prevent them from being drawn into the commu-
nist sphere by giving aid in small amounts. In the case of
Burma this was a difficult policy to pursue inasmuch as even
token aid was unacceptable. The r afore, a request to provide
some aid, albeit indirect, was welcomed.
37The New York Times , April 8, 1953,






In October, 1954, Burma asked the United States to
buy rice with dollars and allocate the grain to needy South-
east Asian countries; Burma would spend the dollars for
39United States technical aid and equipment. Because of the
opportunity to provide aid to Burma again, as well as for
the humanitarian implications, the United States complied
40
with the request.
The United States did not significantly advance nor
impair its image in Southeast Asia by its policies or ac-
tions in Burma. Insofar as their net effect upon other
countries in the area, they constituted a holding operation
with neither gain nor loss involved; insofar as Burma was
concerned, they neither attracted nor repelled.
Indochina
It was in Indochina that the United States policies
received their most severe trial—and were found most want-
ing.
The beginning of 1950 found the French implementing
an earlier agreement by ceding to Bao Dai some autonomy in
domestic matters. While the nowers granted were not exten-
sive, the concession was important as an indication of
39The New York Times , October 15, 1954.
40This program terminated in 1957 when direct economic






intent and warranted congratulations from Ambassador Jessup
who was in Saigon at the time. On January 28, 1950, the
41French Assembly ratified the Elycee Agreement, signed the
preceding March, and so created the independent states of
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—all within the French Union.
The United States recognized the three states on February 7,
1950. 42
The diplomatic corollary to this was the Peking recog-
nition of the Vietminh in January, 1950. The Soviets
extended recognition soon afterward—a development which
43Secretary Acheson said came as a surprise. The sides in
Indochina were now clearly drawn and the framework for an
open East-West confrontation had been established. That the
situation had escalated from a colonial rebellion to a war
of global implications made little difference to the French
except that it opened the door for United States aid.
An aid program specifically aimed at the needs in
Indochina was forthcoming shortly. While Marshall Plan aid
had been given to France in 1949, the United States had not
been enthusiastic about having such aid re-directed to
41The New York Times , January 29, 1950.
42Department of State Bulletin , February 20, 1950,
p. 291.
43Ibld. , February 13, 1950, p. 244.

52
Indochina* To the United States, the need for building up
Europe militarily as well as economically, and the desire to
avoid being involved in Southeast Asia, were sufficient
reasons to disapprove of the transfer of aid materials by
France.
In March, 1950, Ambassador Jessup returned from his
visit to the Far East and the conference with American
Ambassadors in Southeast Asia. He spoke in favor of aid for
Indochina, both military and economic, as well as technical
assistance. This recommendation, coming shortly after
Secretary Acheson*s extension of the Truman Doctrine to
Southeast Asia, reflected the growing consideration being
given to the concept. On Hay 8 in Paris, Secretary Acheson
announced that economic aid and military equipment would be
provided by the United States. Specifically, the aid would
be given to the "Associated States of Indochina and to France
in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting
these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic develop-
44
ment." By making the aid available in the names of the
three countries as well as France, the United States sought
to forestall any charge of suj -r>rting colonialism.
The Conference of Foreign Ministers, meeting in
London, reaffirmed the existence of the interests of Britain
44





and France in Malaya and Indochina, respectively, and agreed
upon the need to combat communism in Southeast Asia as well
as in Europe. While the practical value of this declaration
was slight, it did serve to mitigate criticism which con-
tended that the United States was alone in its efforts.
Having recognized Bao Dai, the United States pro-
ceeded to reassure itself, and others, that this was the
correct thing to do. In a speech in New Dehli, Ambassador
Henderson said:
The United States is convinced that the Bao Dai govern-
ment of Vietnam reflects more accurately than any
rival claimants to power in Vietnam the national
aspirations of the people of that country. 45
In July, W. S. B. Lacy, Director of the Office of Phillip-
pine and Southeast Asia Affairs, spoke of the need to
strengthen Bao Dai both militarily and politically in order
46that the Nationalist Movement in Vietnam could succeed.
The North Korean attack on June 25, 1950, had a dis-
tinct effect upon United States activities in Indochina.
What had been an evolutionary change became, in the urgency
of the situation, more revolutionary in pacing. Military
considerations became paramount not only in Korea but in all
45Before Indian Council of World Affairs, New Dehli,
March 27, 1950, as reported in Vital Speeches , May 15, 1950,
p. 460.
46 Institute of Public Affairs, University of
Virginia, -narlottesville, July 11, 1950, as reported in
Vital Speeches , September 1, 1950, p. 689.
.
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areas where United States interest was active. Military aid
took priority over economic or technical assistance and,
despite the heavy requirements of United States forces in
47
Korea, arras began to arrive in Saigon in August. By
October, the flow of military aid was uninterrupted and
growing, curing fiscal year 1951, expenditures totaled
$104.3 million in military aid and $3.3 million in economic
aid.
Toward the end of 1950, the French assigned General
de Lattre de Tassigny as Commander of French forces in Indo-
china. His arrival, plus the receipt of increased military
aid, marked the beginning of a lively but short demonstra-
tion of superior military power. Vietminh attacks were
soundly defeated and control was strengthened over coastal
areas and cities. Moreover, the nucleus of a Vietnamese
national army was formed and recruiting and training begun.
In January, 1951, President Truman and Premier P levin
met in Washington to discuss, inter alia , United States aid
to France for Indochina. The conference resulted in an
agreement by the United States to increase both the quantity
48
and the timing of military aid, an agreement that was to
be repeated often in the future.
The New York Times , August 11, 1950.
48
Ibid., January 25, 1951.
-
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The United States Minister to Vietnam, in a tele-
vision address on February 10, 1951, spoke of the aid being
received and of its beneficial effect upon the situation.
He emphasized the need to realize that Ho Chi Minn and the
49Vietminh were examples of communism and not nationalism.
Within the Congress, there were differing views as to the
intent and effect of United States aid to Indochina.
Senator Malone, on April 9, 1951, contended it was financing
50the maintenance of colonial slavery in Indochina; Senator
Connally, on August 29, 1951, said the aid not only helped
stop communism in Indochina but also helped Europe by
releasing French troops in Indochina for return to France.
General de Lattre de Tassigny arrived in Washington
for a conference with United States officials concerning the
military aid program. The overall result of the conference
was agreement that more aid was needed and would be forth-
coming. While in Washington, the General spoke to the
National Press Club and denied that the war in Indochina
could be accurately called a colonial war since Indochina
52
was no longer a colony.
49Text as reprinted in Congressional Record . 82d




The New York Times , September 23, 1951.
National Press Club, Washington, September 20, 1951,
as reported in Vital Speeches
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Throughout 1951, French success in Indochina had been
heartening if not decisive. For the first time since 1946,
the Vietminh were being met with an effective defense and
the initiative was not always theirs. In early 1952, as the
election campaign began to become prominent, the eventual
success of the French and Vietnamese in Indochina—with
United States aid, of course—appeared to be the consensus
in the United States. Senator Taft spoke in favor of con-
53tinued aid but no United States troops. General Eisen-
hower iterated this position in a press conference in
54April. While preoccupation with Korea contributed to the
lack of concern for Indochina, the improved situation there
was also encouraging.
The requirements for United States aid were, however,
growing more rapidly than were the authorizations. In
February and again in April, the French requested an in-
crease in amount and a speeding up of the pipe line. Both
requests were agreed to and aid expenditure for fiscal year
1952 totaled $162.5 million, up some $55 million over fiscal
year 1951. The majority of the agreed-to increases were,
however, not delivered until fiscal years 1953 and 1954
53
The New York Times , January 20, 1952.
54Ibid. , April 8, 1952.
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when expenditures were, respectively, $388.9 million and
$538.6 million. 55
With the election oratory finished, there was little
public discussion of Southeast Asia during the last two
months of the year. Senator Smith, on a tour of the area,
spoke concerning possible United States reaction to commu-
nist aggression in Indochina. He considered that the United
States should make clear its intention to invoke sanctions
(i.e., blockade) and to use United States air and naval
56forces—but not troops—to oppose any such aggression.
One further step was accomplished which indicated at
least a token move toward united effort in Indochina. At
the NATO council meeting in Paris in December, the Council,
for the first time, acknowledged that a link existed between
the Asian and European strategies of the allies vis-£-vis
the communists and pledged support to the French in Indo-
.. 57
china.
The Sisenhower Administration, from the beginning,
undertook to expedite and increase the aid to Indochina, and
55U.S. Agency for International Development , Repox -
of United States Foreign Assistance P rograms , Washington,
longresslonal Record , 82d Congress, 2d Session,
pp. 572-57TT
57The New York Times, December 18, 1952.
..
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the early months of the year saw a conference with the
French in Washington to this effect.
In Indochina, the French commander, General Navarre,
proposed a plan for the expansion of the role played by the
Vietnamese in the war. Named the Navarre Plan, it called
for the creation and training of all-native forces to assume
the responsibility for rear areas by taking over administra-
tive and ganison duties. The French forces replaced would
the,, be available for combat duties. Implicit in the plan
was an increase in the amount of material being furnished
under United States aid program. The pace of the war against
the Vietminh was to be increased.
The need for some increase in numerical strength from
a source other than France had been apparent for some months.
By the end of 1952, one-third of all French forces were
engaged in Indochina, and the cost to France was $1 billion
per year. Increase beyond this was not to be expected from
a country that was already thoroughly weary of the sacri-
fices involved.
As the chances of achieving an armistice in Korea
increased, so did apprehension over the possibility of
Chinese intervention in Indochina. The success of the
Chinese amies in Korea and the prestige gained therefrom,
the availability of large numbers of combat-trained troops
and amounts of war materials, and the possibility that the
•.
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Vietrainh might be getting the worst of it, all pointed
toward outright Chinese interference and prompted the joint
United States-French statement that any aggression would
Eg
have "serious consequences • " Subsequent statements , both
unilateral and joint, indicated the seriousness with which
59intervention would be regarded.
In April, 1953, a House study mission, chaired by
Congressman Judd with Congressmen Marrow, 2ablochi, and
Carnahan, toured Southeast Asia in connection with hearings
for the aid program for fiscal year 1954 • Their report sup-
ported an increase in both economic and military aid and
indicated a bi-partisanship not recently present in foreign
affairs*
For the first time, a United States Military Mission
60
visited Indochina to survey the situation first hand*
Previous missions, such as those headed by Griffin and
Melby, had looked at the situation in terms of what aid
might do to help; now, at the invitation of the French, a
purely military mission would look into the need for aid in
terms of extent and type* Moreover, this visit enabled the
58The New York Times . March 29, 1953.
59
In particular, Dulles* statement to the American
Legion in September, op. cit*
The New York Times . June 20, 1953*
•' •
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United States to get information concerning the war which
had heretofore been available only from French sources.
This latter point was important for it provided an oppor-
tunity to verify or disprove certain basic factors on which
policy rested.
The United States assumed that the French were, and
would continue, pressing the fight with the accepted goal
being the independence of Indochina, Consonant with this,
in the United States view, was the need to keep fighting and
not allow the situation to bog down into a stalemate. What
the mission could perhaps learn was the extent to which
these aims were held in common and were being pursued.
On July 3, the French announced their intention to
enter into new negotiations concerning the independence and
sovereignty of the three Associated States, This belated
recognition of the inadequacy of the Slysee agreements was
doubtless brought about by a combination of Vietnamese and
Cambodian protests together with United States pressure.
The announcement was gratifying to the Unite ates, not
only for its further reducing the basis for charges of
colonialism, but also for its hoped-for effect of creating
greater indigenous enthusiasm for the fight for freedom in
Indochina, Secretary Dulles considered that, while there
had been criticism concerning the lack of French promises
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for independence for the three states, "the basis for that
61
criticism should now be removed."
The end of the war in Korea did release Chinese war
material for the Vietminh and the Intensity of the combat
began to increase* Where Vietminh attacks had been con-
ducted in the style of guerrilla warfare, the increase in
supplies permitted them to adopt more conventional methods
with increasing frequency* What had been a gradually-rising
curve of military success for the French leveled briefly and
then worsened*
While this situation was due in part to an increase
in aid from the Chinese, it was also attributable to an
absence of success in political indoctrination of the
populace* Little was known in the West of guerrilla warfare
and its vastly differing requirements* Therefore, little
attention was paid to what the people wanted, particularly
if it did not conform to conventional military plans* But
as successful guerrilla warriors, such as Mao Tse Tung, well
know, the sympathetic support of the civilian populace is
essential for success* That the French did not subscribe to
this theory was demonstrated from the very first) in late
1953, the French forces still paid little heed to the
desires of the people but, instead, operated on the premise




that what was good for France was good for Vietnam. Thus,
by the end of the year, the three parties involved in fight-
ing the Vietroinh each had different aims: the French were
fighting to retain control over Indochina? the Vietnamese
were fighting for independence; and the United States was
fighting to stop communism. With such diverse points of
aim, variations in enthusiasm were inevitable.
By the end of 1953, French resolve had weakened in
the face of awesome costs of Indochina, and public opinion
in France was active in support of some sort of escape-with-
decency. For the United States, any cession of the effort
would be a backward move from a stand which dictated keeping
the pressure on the communists whenever possible. In a
62press conference on December 29, Secretary Dulles spoke of
stronger measures by the United States which might be forth-
coming should the Chinese attempt to hasten the Vietminh
victory by overt intervention. It was not the last to be
heard of such stronger measures.
The beginning of 1954 brought with it a disquieting
feeling concerning Indochina, but no real indication of the
extent of the disappointment to be experienced. From the
outset, however, developments seemed to be adverse.
In Indochina, the French had decided to establish, at
62
The New York Times, December 30, 1953.
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Dien Bien Phu, an outpost of French strength which would at
once reassure the civilian populace and convince the Viet-
rainh armies of the superiority of the French forces. Dien
Bien Phu was chosen for its proximity to Laos, where the
Vietminh had recently become active, and for its position
astride the Vietminh supply line from China* Topographi-
cally, the position to be defended lay in the bottom of a
bowl-shaped formation of hills. There was room enough for a
small airfield*
Military history will identify few important defen-
sive positions with the initial shortcomings of Oien Bien
Phu* Not only was it remote from the main bases on the
coast, with lines of communication by air only, but it was
also located so that artillery fire could be poured on it
from all directions* Yet to the French, it was defensible
by virtue of complete air superiority and the demonstrated
lack oi artillery in the Vietminh forces.
The United States became involved in Dien Bien Phu
early in the siege when two hundred United States personnel
were assigned to provide maintenance for the aircraft em-
ployed in resupplying the French forces* Congressional
interest was aroused lest this be the forerunner to a build-
up of American forces, and only assurances from President
CO
Eisenhower, quieted the general feeling of apprehension.






In the last week of January, 1954, the Foreign
Ministers of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States
met in Berlin to discuss the situations which were creating
world unrest. Originally, the agenda included such obvious
trouble spots as Berlin and Austria as well as Korea; but,
after the meeting began, the situation in Indochina was
included.
Whether Britain's Anthony Eden proposed including
64Indochina &c an agenda item at the forthcoming Geneva Con-
65ference, or whether Francis M. Bidault suggested it, the
United States accepted it in the spirit that one accepts
castor oil—without liking it and while learning the worst.
The apprehension was well borne out.
Agreed upon in Berlin was a Geneva Conference, to be
convened April 26, for the "purpose of reaching a peaceful
66
settlement of the Korean questions" as well as discussing
the pre lem of restoring peace in Indochina. The Chinese
communists were to be represented in discussions of both
aspects
•
Upon his return to the United States from Berlin,
64Clubb, o£. cit
• , p. 57.
65Speech by Anthony Eden before House of Commons,
June 23 and 24, as reported in Vital Speeches t August 1,
1954, p. 578.
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Secretary Dulles found himself under attack frost all direc-
tions for his acceptance of the agenda for the upcoming
Geneva Conference* Criticism from the Republican Party was
both the most unexpected and the most vehement* Senator
67Knowland was a particularly outspoken critic* What the
critics found most unacceptable was the participation of the
Chinese communists and the possibility that one result of
the conference would be United States recognition of China*
Senator Dulles found it necessary to reassure both the
public and the Congress that such would not be the case*
Following the agreements in Berlin, military activity
in Vietnam increased in tempo and successes of the Yietminh
became more numerous* Where the French had been hopeful of
maintaining a status quo in order to strengthen their bar-
gaining position, they now found their position becoming
weaker by the day* The increased supplies from China, the
active support of the civilian population, and good leader-
ship, enabled the Vietminh to take the offensive despite a
numerical inferiority of two to one and no air power*
On March 13, 1954, the Vietminh siege of Dien Bien
Phu began* Now equipped with field artillery emplaced in
the hills around the area, General Giap*s forces commenced a
relentless bombardment of the French positions, concentrat-
ing first in the airfield. With French air supply reduced





to practically nothing, the Communists proceeded systemati-
cally to overrun the peripheral French positions one by one.
So critical had the military situation become that
the French were constrained to request direct military
assistance from the United States—something they had not
done before. In so doing, they provided the ground work for
an internal crisis which brought the United States to the
brink of intervention.
From about mid-March until the end of April, events
in Washington moved rapidly and in an atmosphere of secrecy.
Beginning with the visit of General Ely on March 20, the
subject of intervention, unilateral or united, using ground
forces or not, occupied much of the official thinking.
Accounts of what took place during that critical
period are, unfortunately, all unofficial since none of the
principals involved has chosen to write or speak on the
subject. Nevertheless, these unofficial reports have been
detailed enough to permit an understanding of what went on.
Two of the better known, which have had wide acceptance, are
68 69the accounts of Chalmers Roberts, and Joseph C. Harsch.
68
Chalmers Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War,"
The Reporter , September 14, 1954, pp. 32-35, as reprinted in
World of Crisis , by F. H. Hartman (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 191T2), pp. 240-247.
69Joseph C. Harsch, Christian Science Monitor , April





The former account, in particular, has become the serai-
offical authority for happenings in early April.
General Ely's visit to Washington was in the nature
of an emergency mission. As Chief of Staff of French for-
ces
,
he was a knowledgeable emissary to send seeking mili-
tary assistance, and he was also sufficiently high in the
hierarchy of the French government to merit the attention of
the political as well as the military leaders in Washington*
According to the Roberts' account, General Ely gathered the
impression from his visit that the United States would
respond with direct assistance at any time that France so
desired, and he notified Paris to this effect. Whether his
impression was correct or not, the shock created by his
report of the seriousness of the situation in Indochina did
set United States leaders to thinking and talking about
70intervention
•
On March 29, Secretary Dulles spoke of the need for
"united action" to prevent the communists from taking over
Southeast Asia. He expressed a willingness to act firmly,
and he hoped that any potential aggressor was listening con-
cerning the forthcoming conference at Geneva—the aim there
70S. Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper &
Bros., 1961). According to Adams, the French asked for air
strikes in support of Dien Bien Phu. President Eisenhower





was "to bring about a united and independent Korea. " As for
Indochina, he hoped the discussions would seek to convince
71the Chinese communists of the error of their ways. Four
days later, Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford held the
emergency briefing for Congressmen, which Mr, Roberts
covered in detail in his article. If the narrative is
accurate—and there is no evidence to indicate that it is
not—it was a day on which the United States approached as
near to war as it could without being fully and finally
committed. It was not a "doves and hawks" episode but
rather a meeting between hawks and owls—and the owls pre-
vailed.
The crisis was not over by any means; it was just
narrowed to exclude unilateral intervention as being wholly
unacceptable to the people and to the Congress. Joint
action with Allies, however, remained a possibility.
In early April, at a meeting at the White House,
President Elsenhower had agreed to the request of Mr. Dulles
and Admiral Radford to send American forces into Indochina
"under certain strict conditions." In essence, these con-
ditions specified, first, that the French would have to
continue to fight in Indochina until the war was successfully
71













concluded and, second, that United States participation
would be as a part of a force composed of Austrialian,
British, and New Zealand troops, plus units from Far East
72
countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines,
On April 7, President Eisenhower publicly joined the
discussion group when he referred to the situation in South-
73
east Asia in terras of the "falling domino" principle. On
April 5, Secretary Dulles told the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs that the United States was determined to
prevent Indochina from falling into the hands of the comrou-
74
nists. On April 16, Vice President Nixon iterated that
the United States would face up to what must be done in
75Indochina to keep the communists out. It was clear that
the United States considered the situation to be extremely
grave and that action was necessary.
7<_Adams, o£, cit., p, 122. The French view of this was
less enthusiastic, however. The Secretary General of the
Foreign Affairs Study Center (Paris), M, Jacques Vernant,
writing in Revue de Defense Nationale (April 1964, p. 707)
cites General ?ly as stating France was lukewarm to Allied
intervention. To the French, time was critical and the delay
incident to obtaining Allied approval would have been fatal,
73The New York Times, April 8, 1954.
74King, 0£, cit . t p. 169.
75Address to Newspaper Editors Convention, April 16,
1954, Washington. The speech was "off the record" but was
widely publicized that the Department of State felt it




Having had to abandon the concept of unilateral
intervention, the United States turned to the multilateral
concept • Here, however, success was no easier to attain.
From the first, Britain had opposed the idea and had success-
fully prevented any real progress among the other would-be
Allies* As it became known later, Britain was opposed to
the armed intervention for
• • • three reasons which then seemed to be good and
still seem to be good* Firstly, we were advised that
air action alone could not have been effective
j
secondly, any such military intervention could have
destroyed the chances of a settlement at Geneva;
thirdly, it might well have led to a general war in
Asia* 76
In early April, however, Secretary Dulles did not have
-liable to him this reasoning; all that he knew was that
Britain was obstructing progress* Therefore, he proposed a
visit to London, was accepted, and on April 10 departed for
Europe*
The reception given Mr, Dulles must have convinced
him of the futility of near-term intervention, for he thn
proposed the creation of 3SATO. After a brief stop in Paris,
Mr. Dulles returned to the United States on April 15* What
he had accomplished was little in terms of his original mis-
sion, but he did come away with approval of the concept of
a regional defense organization.
*7 8
foreign Minister Sden in House of C tmons, June 23








Apparently, one final attempt at gaining British
approval for military action in Indochina was made by Secre-
tary Dulles on April 23 and 24. in Paris enroute to Geneva,
the Secretary, according to Mr* Roberts 1 account, sought
British agreement to assist the French, but the reply was
still "no*" 77
On the day that the Geneva Conference met to begin
discussions of the Korean questions, President Eisenhower
again spoke of the importance the United States attached to
preventing a communist take-over of Indochina by stating:
"We have here a sort of cork in the bottle, the bottle being
the great area that includes Burma, Thailand, and Indo-
78
china, " Secretary Dulles, on the eve of the first meeting
in Geneva to discuss Indochina, spoke to the country by
radio, citing the danger which threatened Southeast Asia and
what the United States had done in the past* He then stated
that the pressing need now was for collective defense to
79
resist this expansion of international communism* This
then, the need for collective defense, was a recurrent one
in speeches made during the next four months*
77
Mr* Roberts reports that this was the end of any
serious interest on the part of the United States to inter-
vene in Indochina*
"Wore the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington,
April 26, as reported In The New York Times . April 27*
79Secretary Dulles* speech May 7, as reported in The









On May 7, 1954, Dien Blen Phu surrendered to the
Vletminh forces after fifty-five days of siege* For the
last month, the French had been unable to do more than pro-
vide some airlift for the wounded and to parachute a few
supplies to the foct.* As the outposts were overrun, the
area shrank to the point where even helicopter operations
could not be conducted.
From the beginning, Dien Blen Phu had heen stamped
with the brand of misfortune* Not only was it remote from
French (and United States) sources of supplies, as con-
venient to supply bases in China* Thus, one of its early
advantages, that of artillery superiority, was soon overcome
and reversed* The Vletminh strategy was one of gradual
80
erosion of the perimeter positions together with concen-
trated attacks upon the air facilities* In due course, this
attrition of the air communications precluded the effective
resupply of the besieged forces and presaged their ultimate
defeat* It was a significant victory for the Vletminh, not
only for its effect upon the Geneva Conference but for its
psychological value to the Vletminh themselves* lier in
the war (1951) the French had been able to defeat Vletminh
81forces in direct confrontations* Now, for the first time,
80General V* N* Giap, People's War , People's Army
(New York? Frederick A. Pr^eger, 1^62 3, pp. ilO-214.
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native forces were victorious* The victory date became an
important day of celebration in North Vietnam for it not
only set a favorable stage for the Geneva Conference, but it
further solidified popular acceptance, and even support, of
the Vletminh throughout Indochina.
In Geneva, the first plenary session devoted to the
Indochina question met May 8* Except in the case of the
United states, the countries attending were represented by
their Foreign Ministers with Chou En-Lai sitting in for
Communist China* The United States was representee* by Under
Secretary of State Smith.
The first session was taken up by the French Foreign
Minister, M* Bidault, setting forth the French position
which called for an immediate cease-fire to be followed by
discussion of the political problems* In Indochina, the
fall of Dien Men Phu had freed additional Vletminh troops
and large-scale attacks against French positions in the Red
River Delta had begun* An early termination of hostilities
was to the advantage of France* After the cease—fire, Vlet-
minh and Vietnamese forces were to be withdrawn to areas to be







The Viatminh counter proposals, presented Hay 10, in-
cluded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Indochina,
the holding of elections and the recognition of Vietminh-
sponsored governments in Laos and Cambodia* As a possible
attraction to the French, the matters of membership .'. he
French Union and protection of Frencii interests were to
receive full consideration*
As initial proposals, each attracted supporters in
accordance with established political doctrine; Russia and
China supported the Vietminh and Britain and the Uni
States upported France* In the circumstances, the dis-
cussions became mired in a welter of speeches, all aimed at
improving one's own position in the negotiations* Con-
cessions of significance did not seem to be forthcoming from
either side, and the conference neared the point of break-
down* Faced with this, a gradual easing of the intransi-
gence on bot: sides began to be evident.
On Hay 25, Mr. Sden suggested that military represen-
tatives from both sides come to Geneva to assist in arriving
at an agreement for an armistice* On May 29, this proposal
was accepted , and it was announced that armistice negotia-
tions between the French Union and the Democratic ^public
of Vietnam would be undertaken immediately* It was th
first progress of note to be madr , but it immediately raised





composition and authority of the Armistice Commission
occupied the attention of the delegates and, for the next
two weeks, dominated discussions at Geneva. Russia proposed
Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, and Pakistan as members; the
United States objected on the grounds that a commission com-
posed of equal members of communists and non-communists had
proved useless in Korea* China rejected a Vietnamese pro-
posal to have the United Nations accept responsibility for
maintaining the armistice, and Russia rejected a British
proposal that commission members come from Colo >ower
countries*
Meanwhile, the Government of French Premier Lani-
fell on June 12, and with it hopes that the deadlock in
Geneva could be resolved quickly dimmed*
In the United States, meanwhile, Secretary Dulles
continued to urge collective defense* In a press conference
on Kay 25, he indicated that collective security in South-
east Asia was something the United States had supported
83
since 1951; and, in a major address in Los Angeles on
June 11, he disavowed unilateral intervention by che United
States in the present circumstances* He added, howev<
8 3The New York Times . Hay 26, 1954.
84Before the *lorl& Affairs Council, Los Angeles,




that if the Chinese intervened openly, then the situation
would be changed and the United States might well intervene*
The crisis in France passed more quickly than had
been expected and, on June 17, M» Mendes-France was con-
firmed as the new rremier* His initial speech tc I
Assembly was to promise to do all possible to attain peace
in Indochina and to resign from office if he had net
achieved it by July 20. He also promised that, In attaining
85peace "France will maintain her presence in the Far East."
Coincident or not, business at the Conference began
to im rove with the arrival of M. Mendes-France* Agreemc
on the timing of discussions on Cambodia and Laos, and post-
armistice elections in Vietnam, and political settleme
between Chou En-Lai and Mendes-France were reached* Despite
this progress, however, there remained the question of
whether or not the French Assembly would accept the final
outcome—a question which remained unanswered until the end.
Toward the end of June, an undeclared recess for the
principals appeared to be desirable* Eden, accompanied by
Prime Minister Churchill, came to Washington for meetings
with President Eisenhower on June 25* Chou En-Lai returned
to Peking via New Delhi and Rangoon where he had conferences
with Nehru and U Nu. The intermission was doubtless
jeech in French National Assembly, Tune 17, 1954,
as reported in Vital Speeches , August 1, 1954, p. 585*
•ctateaA
77
profitable in the long run, if for no other reason than that
it provided a respite in which informal consultations could
take place*
The Churchill-Eisenhower meetings in Washington ended
without resolution of major differences. A final communique,
however, iterated the common ties and reaffirmed the strength
86
of the alliance* The principal difference was that con-
cerning admission of Communist China to the United Nations
and Congressional reaction to this was volatile* In an
election year, any such "softness" toward coram was
political suicide and the orators of both parties lost no
time in denouncing it*
The conference resumed in an atmosphere of general
optimism* Partition of Vietnam, at least temporarily,
seemed to be the solution, and it was toward this end that
both sides proceeded* For the United States, however, this
concept, or the alternative of a coalition government,
seemed to doom Vietnam to communism | and, therefore, It was
not welcomed* General Smith had not returned to Geneva so
the United States appeared to be disassociating itself from
the conference*
This reluctance on the part of the United States to
participate in the negotiations caused K* Mendes~France to






propose a Paris meeting of Eden, Dulles and himself with a
view to seeking some resolution of the difficulty* The out-
come of the meeting, held July 13 and 14, was to return
General Smith to Geneva but to "reserve" the United States
position on the final settlement*
General Smith arrived back in Geneva on July 17 as
the settlement was in its final stages of preparation* In
view of the United States attitude toward the discussions,
it is probable that the American delegation took no direct
part in the negotiations at this time but remained on the
sidelines, proffering advice through the French delegation*
Sarly in the morning of July 21, the Vietnam armis-
tice was signed, followed later in the day by the signing of
the Cambodian and Laotian truce agreements* The final con-
ference declaration was not signed but was accepted by all
except the United States and the State of Vietnam, both of
whom Issued unilateral declarations* The United States
declaration "took note" of the agreements concluded and
declared that it would "refrain from the threat or the use
of violence to disturb them*"
The main provisions of the armistice agreement for
Vietnam were the demarcation line roughly along the 17tt
parallel, the withdrawal of French and Vietminh forces from
North and South Vietnam, respectively, within three hundred










internees within thirty days* The agreements for Laos and
Cambodia generally called for the withdrawal of all foreign
troops except for small French training missions, and free-
dom from discrimination for members of opposing forces.
Supervision of the execution of the armistice would be pro-
vided by an International Commission composed of representa-
tives of India, Canada, and Poland—with the Indian
representative acting as Chairman in each case.
The declaration noted the full independence of the
three states and provided for free elections by secret
ballot La each. Cambodia and Laos were to have elections in
1955 and Vietnam in July, 1956* The Vietnamese, but not the
Cambodian nor Laotian, elections were to be supervised by
the International Commission* None of the three could enter
into military alliances or permit military bases under for-
eign control to be established on their territory except f
two French bases in Laos*
Reactions to the conference agreements were varied*
Russia and China hailed them as major achievements and par-
ticularly the parts relating to the prohibition of alliances*
Britain regarded them as preventing fiocld War III and a
demonstration of superior British diplomacy* .ranee greeted
them with relief at seeing the end of the war, and despite










87terms, the Assembly approved the agreements with enthusi-
asm.
In the United States, however, the reception was less
favorable* Both political parties regarded the agreements
as a diplomatic defeat the matter did not become a
significant campaign issue* Inasmuch as the result came
from actions and policies carried out by both parties, the
could, in honesty, be no more blame on one than on the other*
Nevertheless, the Democrats could not resist the temptation
to point at the inconsistencies between Geneva and the
Republican campaign promises of two years ago*
The United States agreed to aid South Vietnam in
repatriating civilians from Northern Vietnam and made avail-
able military sea transport for that purpose* actual
transfer was accomplished during the winter months of 1954-
1955 and in sufficient time to meet the May, 1955, deadline*
Immediately after Geneva, the French took steps to
insure the presence of French interests in North Vietm
Premier Kendes-France appointed Jean Sainteny, a personal
friend of Ho Chi Minn, as French representative with the
Vietminh, and M* Sainteny negotiated agreements relating to
68French citizens and business interests in Tonking* The
a'-
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Speech in Assembly, July 22, as :ted in ' he New
York Times , July 23.









United States was opposed to this relationship as being
inimical to the interests of South Vietnam, but to no avail*
The immediate post-Geneva period saw the United
States striving to regain equilibrium in the conduct of for-
eign affairs. In Europe, the defeat of the European Defense
Community by France on August 30 bespoke the need for re-
assessment in that area. In Southeast Asia, 1954 he n
the United States run the gamut. As Joseph C, Harsch wrote
"in April, the United States walked up to the brink of war
with Communist China and turned away. This week it walked
up to the brink of a dissolution of the alliance, and al
89turned back." Now having returned to the fold, bhe United
States sought to emphasize its ties with others. Earlier in
the year, United States leadership was the dominant theme as
when Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Robertson testified before the House Committee on Appropria-
tions :
... A cold war waged under the leadership of the
United States, with the constant threat of attack
against Red China, led by Formosa and other Far
Eastern groups and meticulously supported by the
United States. 90
Now the emphasis was on partnership and collective security.
As President Eisenhower stated in a press conference on
89Christian Science 'onitor , July 17, 1954.
90Congressional Record , 83c Cong., 2d Sess, 9 p. 125.
.
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91August 4, ". • . we are trying to be a good partner," In
effect, whi e deploring what had happened in Indochina, the
United States turned hopefully to the development of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as the instrument best
suited to further United States interests in Southea ^ia.
This discussion has b&en confined to what transpired
in Vietnam, principally because that was the main area of
action, and not because of any intent to slight, or under-
play, Cambodia and Laos, These two kingdoms, nominally
independent under French supervision, had been beside, not
in, the ebb and flow of conflict in Vietnam. The Vietminh
had encouraged d lent groups in both countries but, until
late 1953, its strength had not heen sufficient to suppo.
the anti-French movements in either.
Then, too little time remained before Geneva. In
Cambodia, resistance was embodied in the so-called Khmer
government and in Laos in the Pathet-Lao. The Vietminh, at
Geneva, sought recognition of both but was unsuccessful.
The effect of the Geneva Agreements upon both countries was
to neutralize them with full independence.
•1









Advocacy by the United States of the principle of
collective security, as countenanced in the United Nations
Charter, stems mainly from the Vanderberg Resolution of
June 11, 1948. This declaration called for the "progressive
development" of collective arrangements for self-defense in
accordance with the Charter and "association of the United
States" with such arrangements. This resolve was, however,
not to be actively pursued by the United States insofar as
Southeast Asia was concerned until three years later*
Prior to the communist victory in China, the United
States had centered its attentions in the Asian theater on
Japan and Nationalist China, with an occasional Interest in
the Philippines and Indonesia. As long as the political
situation in Asia remained oriented in a pro—Western direc-
tion, the need for collective defense arrangements was not
apparent* With communist success in China, however, the
situation changed* Chinese communists on the Xndochinese
border posed a definite threat not only to Indochina but to
the remainder of Southeast Asia* The United States began to
evince an increased interest in the affairs of the area, but
this concern did not yet include a desire for collective
security agreements*
The Korean War, superimposed upon the collapse of
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in United States policy vis-£-vis Asia* The original post-
war policy had been predicated upon having a strong and
friendly China exercising influence over the area and pro-
moting stability. When it was obvious that the combined
conditions of strength and friendliness were no longer to be
found in China, change was necessary* In these circumstances
the United states turned toward Japan and commenced negotia-
tions to secure a peace treaty which would reestablish, to
some extent, Japanese strength and influence* These negotia-
tions, in turn, developed situations which required further
revisions of policy*
It was apparent in seeking acceptance of a Japanese
peace treaty that the governments of the Philippines,
Australia, and New Zealand were concerned for their future
safety should Japan be permitted to gain enough strength to
become an aggressor again* Accordingly, they sought assur-
ances of protection from the United States as conditions of
their acceptance of the Japanese peace treaty* The United
States acceded to their wishes and concluded a treaty of
mutual defense with the Philippines on August 30, 1951, and
a mutual security treaty for the Pacific Ocean area, the
anzus Treaty, with New Zealand and Australia on September 1,
1951.
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The desire of Australia and New Zealand to
establish some sort of security relationship with the
United States is understandable* As a result of
World War II, these countries feared the resurgence
of Japanese aggression and they were deeply concerned
about the possibility of Japanese rearmament* Their
national inclination, therefore, was to think in
terms of a peace treaty that would make such eventu-
alities impossible* They would agree to a generous
treaty imposing no restrictions upon Japanese re-
armanent only if the United States would formally
express concern for their security and agree to stand
with them in the event of an attack* The security
treaty between the United States on the one hand,
and Australia and New Zealand on the other hand,
gave these countries the assurance they needed and,
at the same time served the national interests of the
United States. 93
Two other aspects of the ANZUS Treaty are of interest,
The first is the indefinite and undefined "Pacific Ocean
Area" to which the Treaty was applicable* The accepted
interpretation was that the area consisted of all of -.he
Southwest Pacific except the mainland of Southeast Asia but
especially those waters contiguous to Australia* The second
feature was the exclusion of European powers, particularly
the United Kingdom, from the Treaty* The United Kingdom had
hoped to be a party to the Treaty and to have Malaya in-
cluded in its coverage* The United States, however, was
unwilling to accede to either wish, preferring instead to
maintain the anti-colonial aura of the pact* The principal
result of this exclusion was a continuing interest on the
93United States Congress, Senate Executive Report No *
2, 82d Congress, 2d Session, February 14, 1952*
0**3
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part of the United Kingdom In forming a further collective
security organization to which she could belong* To this
end, she was ready to accept the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization In 1954 despite disagreeing with both it*
membership and its timing*
ANZUS was an important step for the United States;
and, in spite of its obvious inherent limitations, the
Treaty established an essential precedent for participation
in multilateral collective security in Southeast Asia* It
was not demanding of significant expense or effort on the
part of any signatory, and it did permit the United States
to strengthen Japan to a greater degree than would have been
possible otherwise*
The greatest shortcoming of ANZUS as an instrument of
United States policy in the Far Sast was, of course, the
lack of non-Western members* While the Treaty was origi-
nally aimed at preventing Japanese aggression, it carried
with it the ancillary Intent of deterring communism; and this
aspect, in particular, required Southeast Asian participa-
tion* Moreover, a gathering of Western nations was not
attractive to Asians who were recently free, despite the
fact that none of the Western group had a history of coloni-
alism*
One final point which was to have continuing perti-






provision whereby an attack upon one member was considered
to be an attack upon all; no further declaration of war by
the Congress was necessary for the United States to become
involved. This usurpation of Congressional prerogative by
the executive did not go unnoticed, and the Senate was not
prone to consent to another treaty which contained a similar
provision. Returning to what Ambassador Dulles termed
94
"Monroe Doctrine Language," the ANZUS Treaty, as well as
the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, provided for
each of the signatories to "act to meet the common dangers
in accordance with its constitutional process." This per-
missive feature became standard language in subsequent
treaties.
SEATO
In early 1953, the United Kingdom, taking advantage
of a change of Presidents, proposed to the United States the
94
Before Senate Hearing as reported in The New York
Times, January 29, 1952.
95United States Congress, Senate Executive Report A,
83d Congress, 2d Session. This aspect was further discussed
in this light in the course of hearings on the Korean Defense
Treaty. The committee then noted that the use of this
formula "permits the United States to take any action deemed
appropriate by our constitutional processes, and gives ade-
quate assurance of support to the other country which may be
the victim of an attack. It has the addional advantage of
never having been challenged throughout our history, from the
constitutional stand point, as attaining the balance of power
between the President and Congress."













formation of a strong defense organization for Southeast
Asia—in effect, extending the principle of NATO to South-
east Asia. In this proposal, the United Kingdom had the
tacit approval of France. The United States, however,
opposed the suggestion inasmuch as it appeared to offer more
disadvantage than gain*
In the first place, ANZUS had been in being only a
year, and the need further to change policies by including
the United Kingdom and France was not apparent* Rather, an
important reason for excluding them—fear of indicating
support of colonialism in Southeast Asia—seemed to be
strengthened* There were, however, differences of opinion
within the government concerning the desirability of any
miltilateral arrangement between East and West along the
lines of NATO* The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
had stated its conviction that "a multilateral agreement for
the Pacific, comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, would
be desirable*" Secretary Dulles, however, responded
that substantial cultural, political, and geographical
difference existed among the Pacific countries which
distinguished this area from Europe and constituted
serious obstacles to achieving the desired development
at an early date*
The Committee acknowledged these difficulties "but neverthe-
less expressed the hope that the Department of State would
Low, oj>* cit * , p* 212*
•I>.
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continue its efforts to encourage" such an arrangement for
97
regional defense* This Congressional interest in a multi-
lateral arrangement for the Pacific did evoke at least
thought within the Executive Branch, and President Eisen-
93hower spoke for "United action" in Southeast Asia as a
policy aim of the United States*
Early in 1954, the efforts of the United States to
organize a regional collective security defense pact for
Southeast Asia became more noticeable* Following the For-
eign Ministers meeting in Berlin, the disappointment over
France's reluctance to carry on with the fight in Indochina
was accompanied by the realisation that unilateral inter-
vention by the United States was unacceptable, particularly
if it involved the use of American ground forces* Even his
own political party turned on Secretary Dulles, saying they
would hold him responsible in getting the United States
99involved in war* Yet this possibility continued to loom
large as Ho Chi Minn continued to make substantial gains in
Indochina* Within the government, there was increasing
pressure to do something to halt communist advances in
97Reported in Senate Executive Report No. JL, 84tt
Congress, 1st Session, as having taken place aE Committee
Hearing on Korean Defense Treaty*
98The New York Times . April 17, 1953.
"ibid*, February 23, 1954*
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Southeast Asia* Secretary Dulles, in a speech in New York
on March 29, called for "united action" to meet the
threat | yet, five days later, Dulles, meeting with Congres-
101
sional leaders, sought approval for unilateral action*
Their demurral gave added impetus to the search for an
instrument for "united action."
On April 10, Secretary Dulles flew to Europe for con-
ferences, first in London and then Paris* From the state-
ment issued after the meetings, it could be surmised that
the principal subject discussed was collective defense in
Southeast Asia* The joint statement by Dulles and the For-
eign Ministers on April 14, 1951, read:
We recognize that the prolongation of the war in
Indochina, which endangers the security of the coun-
tries immediately affected, also threatens the
entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western
Pacific* In close association with other nations,
we will examine the possibility of establishing,
within the framework of the United Nations Charter,
a collective defense to assure the peace, security,
and freedom of this area* 102
Having reached broad agreement with the United Kingdom
and France on the subject, United States policy appeared to
be firmly oriented toward collective action in Southeast
Asia* The President said, in a press conference on May 5,
1Q0The New York Times , March 30, 1954.
Hartman, op * cit
• , p* 242.
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that "most free nations of the area had shown affirmative
103interest" in the concept; and Secretary Dulles, at a news
conference on Hay 25, gave the principle historical respec-
tability by saying:
The position of the United States towards collective
security in Southeast Asia has been known basically
for quite a long while* In fact it really goes back
to the time when I went out to the Far Sast in, X
think, January of 1951, on a Mission to try and create
a collective security pact in that area. 104
By June, 1954, the only points of difference concern-
ing the pact were in regard to membership and timing* In
these matters, the United States and the United Kingdom
represented the extreme positions: the United Kingdom
wanted to proceed slowly in setting up the organisation,
waiting at least until the Geneva Conference was concluded,
105
and to include the Colombo powers as members; the United
States was anxious to get the organisation going and did not
106
agree on the importance of Including the Colombo powers*
Tne end of the Geneva Conference brought resolution
of these differences* Within three weeks of the Geneva
Declaration, the SSATO Conference was scheduled to meet, and
103Ibid., May 6, 1954.
104Ibld , . May 26, 1954.
India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia.
106Chatham House Study Group, Collective Defense in
Southeast Asia (London: Royal Institute of InternationaT""









the Colombo powers had been invited to participate* To no
one's surprise, all except Pakistan declined* Pakistan *s
acceptance was more likely the result of a "don 't-follow-
India" princip* than a dedication to Southeast Asian
defense.
On September 6, 1954, the SEATO Conference convened
in Manila with delegations present from Australia, France,
New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and
United States* Some comment was caused by the absence of
Mr* Eden, which some credited to H. Nehru »s adverse attitude
toward the conference* The official, and accepted, explana-
tion, however, was that it was caused by the crisis in
Europe at that time—the fall of the European Defense Com-
munlty. 108
The work of the conference was speedily completed and,
on September 3, 1954, the Treaty establishing 5£AT0 was
109
signed* Also signed was the Pacific Charter, sponsored
by the Philippines, which pledged SEATO members to "uphold
the principles of equal rights and self-determination of
people" and "to promote self-government and to secure the
Barnett, op * cit *. p. 316*
108Low, 0£. cit *. p. 217.
109Signing for the United States was Secretary Dulles









independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and
are able to undertake its responsibilities*" As a statement
of principles, it was intended to refute any allegation that
S2AT0 was based upon, or supported, colonialism. Secretary
Dulles called the Charter "the most momentous product of the
conference •
Despite the speed and scope of the conference, the
meeting in Manila was not totally free of last minute modi-
fications* Pakistan wanted to insure that collective
defense would be operable against any aggression, not just
communist aggression* This ran counter to the United States
desires and resulted in a United States "understanding"
being attached to the Treaty* The Austrlalians announced
that their forces would not be committed to any intra-
Commonwealth (i.e., India-Pakistan) dispute* The rapidity
with which the Manila Pact was approved and signed proved to
be something of a propaganda tool for the communists and
even for the neutralists* Obviously, the conference had
been presented with a prepared text which was not open to
full discussion and debate* The concept was Western, and
the organization was formed in that light* As an instrument
for the defense of the Orient, SSATO was significantly lack-
ing in Oriental thought, origin, and membership*
The provisions of the Treaty were more flexible than
those of the NATO pact and were, in general, quite loosely
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worded* The purposes of the organization were set forth but
were subject to widely varying interpretations by the
signers* Yet, there were portions of the Treaty which were
precise and familiar* In part, the Treaty iterated those
provisions of the AN*US Treaty and the United States-
Philippines Mutual Defensm Treaty which related to the
commitments and obligations of the parties concerned; in
part, it iterated the intentions of the Colombo Plan to
promote economic welfare in the area*
There were, however, three innovations in the Treaty
which were noteworthy* First, the area of the Treaty which
was delineated specifically excluded Kong Kong and Formosa*
Included were the "entire territories of the Asian Parties'*
south of 21°30*N (Art* VIII)* This was significant for the
United States, for it meant a commitment to the mainland of
Southeast Asia for the first time* It was in this connec-
tion that the United States had included its "understanding"
concerning aggression* In the words of Secretary Dulles,
the "understanding" reflected "the special position of the
United States as the only one of the signatories who does
not have any territory in the treaty area*"
An economic assistance program of Commonwealth
origin which includes all the countries of Southeast Asia
and with which the United States affiliated in 1951*
p. 4*














Second was the provision (pars* 1 of Art* V) which
extended the coverage of the Treaty to state or territories
specifically designated by the signatories, provided they
consented to surh coverage* Attached to the Treaty was a
protocol which so designated Cambodia, Laos, and the free
territory of Vietnam*
Third was the portion (para* 2 of Art* IV) which pro-
vided for united action against not only armed attack but
against subversion from within* This was controversial
inasmuch as it appeared to be tacitly in support of colo-
nialism and in opposition to political change even if change
should be desired by the people* Moreover, it connoted
external interference in domestic affairs* Walter Lippraann,
in commenting on the Treaty, discussed it as: "The first
formal instrument in modern times which is designed to
112license international intervention in internal affairs*"
The Treaty, with attached protocol, was forwarded to
the Senate for its advice and consent on November 10, 1954*
In his covering letter, President Eisenhower drew attention
to those portions of the Treaty which dealt with the area
covered, the membership, and the designation of non-signatory
states or territories by proposing that any future change in
112




any of these articles would require new Senate advice and
consent*
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations met Novem-
ber 11 in an effort to demonstrate their recognition of the
importance of the Treaty* Because of the lateness of the
session, however, a further discussion was put off until the
next Congress* When the Committee did again meet to con-
sider the Treaty, the party in power had changed} but the
attitude of the Committee remained encouraging* In the
course of the hearings, the Committee expressed pleasure
that its earlier belief in the practicability of collective
defense in Southeast Asia had been borne out and satisfac-
tion that the Treaty contained the permissive feature of
meeting danger in accordance with constitutional processes—
114
the "Monroe Doctrine" formula.
The only matter of substance into which the Committee
delved was that concerning possible plans or intentions to
create a standing local defense force in the area* The
Committee was concerned "lest the United States might be
overtaxing itself" in view of its other treaty obligations*
Secretary Dulles replied to the effect that the United
113
united States Congress , Senate Executive Report JK
,
83d Congress, 2d Session*
114United States Senate, Executive Report , No* 1,








States had no intention of building up a large local force
but would rely upon the deterrent power of mobile striking
115forces and that he had so stated at Manila. Without
further ado, the Committee reported favorably, and the
Senate approved the Treaty on February 1 by a vote of 82
to I. 116
As a measure of United States policy in Southeast
Asia, SEATQ had the full concurrence of both political
parties in the Congress and represented a genuine consensus
within the government* There were shortcomings in the
Treaty, of course, the most serious of which was the absence
of important Asian nations from its membership—but over all
it appeared to represent a more dynamic approach to the
problem of containing communism and to be in consonance with
the current doctrine of "massive retaliation*" It was for
the United States the culmination of a program of seeking
military alliances and brought United States participation
in such alliances to every continent except Africa* Curi-
ously, it came at a time when communism seemed to be
retreating from a policy of seeking military alliances, par-
ticularly in Asia*
usibid.




The recor the United States in Southeast Asia
from the end of the war until 1950 was, generally, one of
missed opportunities or, worst of all, Indecision* There
was an interest in the area* There was a feeling of sym-
pathy toward the aspirations of colonial peoples for
independence* But United States participation in Southeast
Asian affairs was conducted within the limiting parameters
normally assigned to matters of secondary importance* The
big show was anti-communism, and it was centered in Europe*
This preoccupation with Europe , and particularly
Western Europe, conditioned post-war policies of the United
States for all other areas* Concern for developments in
Europe dictated policies which were assessed first for their
effect upon that region* In Southeast Asia, the result was
less than successful*
First, in adapting the Europe-oriented policy of
status quo and containment to Southeast Asia, the United
States was temporizing with the often-asserted principle of
self-determination* To the leaders of independence move-
ments in Southeast Asia, this was sufficient to cause them
to move toward neutralism and away from the West* Lost was
the advantage held at the end of the war when the peoples of




Southeast Asia looked to the United States as a champion of
independence and the most likely source of support for their
aspirations* The opportunity to exert influence in Southeast
Asis that could smoothed the transition from colonial-
ism to independence was missed. And with it went the chance
to keep the local communists from posing as a liberating
force* Second was the curious inconsistency of trying to
adapt a policy of massive retaliation to an area for which
it was singularly inappropriate* In underdeveloped areas,
such as Southeast Asia and Southern China, there were, and
are, few targets whose destruction by nuclear attack would
adversely affect guerrilla warfare as practiced by the Yiet-
rnlnh* Moreover, the really effective enemy weapon, subver-
sion, would be undeterred*
There was, however, one unexpected aspect which was
favorable: the Soviet Union, like the United States, was
neglecting Southeast Asia in favor of Europe. In essence,
the post-war period found the independence movements in
Southeast Asia left mostly to their own devices* In the
United States, this indifference toward Southeast Asia was
not confined to the Executive Branch of the government*
Within the Congress, there were exponents of a more positive
policy, but they were few and generally unappreciated*
Some, such as Congressman Judd, were knowledgeable and were
so accepted) others, particularly West Coast Republicans,
HoE it* ii
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were regarded as more partisan than nationalistic in their
criticisms
•
Paradoxically, the era of direct involvement in
Southeast Asia-—the period 1950-1954—was beset with in-
ternal partisans;*..... within the United States* It was the
time of McCarthyism and of the divisive activities of a
Presidential election. Yet, despite campaign promises of
widespread change, the transfer from one administration to
another was accomplished without a reorientation of policy
for Southeast Asia* What commitments had been made were
honored; what had been started was carried forward* The end
product was more bi-partisan than the political climate
would seemed to have permitted*
Events in Southeast Asia since 1954 have, inter alia
.
solidified the united States commitment in the area and high*
lighted the real loss we sustained as a result of our "hands
off" policy in the pre-1950 period* The basic objectives of
American policy in Southeast Asia, political freedom for all
and friendly relationships among countries, remain valid
today* Attaining them, however, is not as easy as it was in
1950 when there was an opportunity for a positive program to
strengthen the area politically and economically* What
emerged instead was a program of response to communist
Department of State Bulletin , November 21, 1955, p»
643*
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initiative—a program which placed the formulation of United
States policies in the hands of the communists.
In Indochina, the goal of a united, free Vietnam
appears to be as far from realization as it has ever been*
Political viability has not been achieved and without it,
no lasting solution to the problem is possible*
On balance, therefore, the conclusion must be drawn
that United States actions, or lack of them, in the immedi-
ate post-war years in Southeast Asia constituted a signifi-
cant handicap to achieving success once the struggle was
joined* The handicap will not be reduced nor can success be
expected unless and until there is political stability in
the area* A military solution to a political problem cannot
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